COMPELLING OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO CAPITULATE:
AN END-STATE TO THE USE OF
MILITARY FORCE

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DENNIS M. ZINK, MAJ, USA
M.A., International Relations, Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri, 1995
B.S., Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska at Kearney, 1990

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Dennis M. Zink

Thesis Title: Compelling other Governments to Capitulate

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Robert Walz, M.A.

_____, Member
Clark Delavan, B.A.

_____, Member
LTC Versalle Washington, Ph.D.

Accepted this 6th day of June 2003 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

COMPELLING OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO CAPITULATE--AN END-STATE TO
USE OF MILITARY FORCE, MAJ DENNIS (DZ) ZINK, 117 PAGES.

There is not a clearly defined framework within the national security dialogue of the
United States, which sufficiently details compelling another government to capitulate as
an end-state to the use of military force. When deciding to use military force the U.S.
should consider all options. One option is to force a belligerent government to capitulate.
Governmental capitulation is defined as "The situation in a country at the national level,
where the ruling authorities have relinquished power and do not control the country. The
military is destroyed or rendered incapable of conducting medium or large- scale
operations. The populace is subjected to martial law by an occupying force."

My research revealed how the roots of strategy, diplomacy, peace, and security intertwine
to reveal models or frameworks that best detail what courses of action can be taken when
nations are faced with threats to national security. Part of this research included
historical examples where governmental capitulation was achieved and produced long-
term peace and stability. It includes examples where governmental capitulation was not
achieved and peace and stability were not secured.

This thesis outlines a model for planning and analyzing the conditions for governmental
capitulation to be used as part of the national security dialogue prior to commitment of
U.S. Armed Forces.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACRONYMS

CALL   Center for Army Lessons Learned.

CBRNE   Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives.

CGSC   Command and General Staff College.

COA   Course of Action.

EEA   Essential Element of Analysis.

FAS   Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability.

G.C.   Governmental Capitulation.

IO   Information Operations.

LIC   Low Intensity Conflict.

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction.

CHAPTER 1

WHY GOVERNMENTAL CAPITULATION?

When this thesis started, initial research indicated no clearly defined United States policy for compelling other governments to capitulate existed. This was only partly correct. The idea of regime change has been around for a long time, but governments don't, as a matter of policy, approach crises with this option available to them. They often fall into it at some later point in time, and as a result often miss opportunities to better set the conditions for capitulation. What doesn't exist is a framework that can be used to analyze when, or if, compelling another government to capitulate is the best course of action for the U.S. to pursue (alone or with others as will be discussed later). Within the national security dialogue of the United States there is an insufficiency in the ways and means to pursue governmental capitulation as an end-state.

If the U.S. is faced with a belligerent nation state as its adversary, and all other means of crisis resolution have failed--ranging from diplomacy, economic means, United Nations endeavors, military overtures, up to and including limited warfare--should the U.S. plan to pursue governmental capitulation as an end-state to the use of military force to ensure peace and stability? How would the U.S. approach this problem? "Is there a need for a framework that assists U.S. National Security planning for pursuing an end-state of governmental capitulation?"

In recent U.S. history, there are several instances when the United States has committed military forces, in an attempt to achieve its national security purposes, without pursuing an end-state of governmental capitulation. These endeavors have not produced the kind of peace and stability the U.S. had hoped for (the first Iraq war, Somalia,

Vietnam, Bosnia). The pursuit of an end-state of governmental capitulation may have resulted in a more beneficial national security posture than was otherwise achieved from the policy undertaken. This is borne out in the recent successes where governmental capitulation became the goal of the use of military force (Panama, Haiti, and Yugoslavia), even though not originally designed that way. Analyzing the conditions surrounding governmental capitulation as an end-state to hostilities, as part of the national security decision-making process, can provide valuable information prior to the commitment of military forces.

The commitment of military forces to conduct offensive operations is one of the most crucial decisions a president can make. How does a president arrive at this decision? What, if any, design does a president use to assists his decision making process. Does that design include planning for and pursuing an end-state of governmental capitulation when committing military forces? A decision-making framework can help define an appropriate end-state. It can help define whether or not commitment of forces should be made at all. It can also facilitate simultaneous planning of other instruments of national power.

To answer these questions, this research will ascertain when there may be a need for, and what the perils may be of, pursuing an end-state of governmental capitulation when military operations are undertaken. This includes the conditions, necessities of, and benefits to U.S. national security. The research used historical examples of complete victories looking for trends or similarities. Research discovered that these similarities could be applied to study possible strategies for future situations concerning U.S. national security interests. These similarities led to the production of quantifiable elements within

the structure of a model. This structure facilitates study of the perils and possibilities associated with pursuing governmental capitulation.

Among the elements within the structure are the likely burdens and requirements the conquering force bears after it achieves capitulation. In analyzing the elements of a framework for planning of governmental capitulation, it was important to find which elements were constant, and which ones varied. How many elements had to be present before governmental capitulation could be pursued was another point of inquiry. Another inquiry related to the elements or conditions that would begin to drive the decision towards pursuing governmental capitulation versus what would force the U.S. to try pursue governmental capitulation in any given crisis or war.

After research began on the elements that would build a case for pursuing governmental capitulation, it was important to look at the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing end-states less than governmental capitulation. In this vein the study looked at limited warfare, appeasement, conciliation and diplomatic concessions, and economic means to convince or coerce desired behavior. The measure of study for the effectiveness of these efforts focused on the end-states resulting from these pursuits. The research needed to demonstrate if it was (or is) necessary to have a complete military victory (not just over the army on the field of battle, but a total defeat of a government or regime by military force) to achieve peace and stability.

The next shift in research and analysis included a study on the requirements for the losing regime/country to become free of occupation by the conquering force (based on the assumption that victory has occurred). As policy researcher John Snell says in his book, "The end of hostilities does not mean peace, it only provides the opportunity for

peace to begun."[1] For that peace to take hold the research found various elements needed to occur. Among these elements were elections, establishment of a popularly supported constitution, economic and individual property rights and freedoms, and a legal system capable of providing redress for the populace in matters of liberty and crime.

The U.S. constitution on the other hand, establishes in our country a hierarchy of players responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. This study took a look at the national level players involved in determining end-states, as well as a look at who decides when end-states short of governmental capitulation are met, and who calls for the withdrawal of forces regardless of the outcome of policy. A study of national level players would not be complete without understanding the criteria they use to make these decisions, and what influences the national level players face when planning to commit forces (such as politics, morality, personal desires/bias, popular will, advisors). A look at who the international players are and how they influence the decision to use force or to pursue governmental capitulation demonstrated a variance of ideologies and organizations at work. How did the U.S. deal with these influences in the past and how can the U.S. minimize the impact of these influences, or work around those forces, to achieve its national security goals in the future.

As part of the research into governmental capitulation, the problems associated with the use of military over a protracted time period was also looked at. There is a proverb about long wars that may be true. "War is the only true zero sum game; those who practice it long enough will soon be left with nothing."[2] Should this proverb influence U.S. decision-making. Is it in the best interest of U. S. policy (U. S. national security) to achieve its goals (including governmental capitulation) as rapidly as possible

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and as completely as possible? The research needed to demonstrate if there were benefits to a slower more deliberate approach.

The research also tried to determine if U.S. use of force should be internationally accepted or conducted unilaterally. During this study, it was noted that definitions are not internationally accepted. The following definitions are used throughout this thesis.

a. Governmental capitulation is described as the situation in a country at the national level, where the ruling authorities are removed from power, the government does not control the country, the military is destroyed or rendered incapable of conducting medium or large scale operations, and the populace is subjected to martial law by the conquering, and subsequently occupying, force. Furthermore, activities for the establishment of a new government may be underway, or will begin soon, and dialogue with exiled leaders may be underway.

b. End-state is defined as the goals and ideal conditions that the U.S. would like to see exist in the country that we become involved in through the use of military force. It may also be used to describe the international climate that the U.S. would like to see exist upon the conclusion of hostilities.

c. Stability can be defined as a regime or government controlling a country in a manner that is beneficial to its citizens, non-threatening to area states, regional neighbors, and developing through economics, education and technology.

d. The DOD definition of national security will be used. National Security is a collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of a nation. Specifically, the condition provided by a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, a favorable foreign relations position, and a defense posture

capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. In a broad sense it is a compilation of all the elements of a country that play a role in securing the interests of that country, through diplomacy, deterrence, and use of force, intelligence, business and trade.[3]

     e. National power refers to the power or force, either overtly or covertly, through any form, such as economic or military, that a country uses in pursuit of its national objectives (primarily, but not limited to national security).

     As with any research there must be constraints on what was not covered for specific reasons. The question at issue should not be confused with the terms "regime change" or "decisive victory." Regime change and decisive victory are only two aspects of governmental capitulation. Regime change can be accomplished without the use of military forces (such as in Haiti), but can also leave undesirable elements in control of the governmental apparatus in some form or fashion. Decisive victory is the aspect of fielding a force that can bring an opposing force to a position of ineffectuality. It stops short of determining end-states and does not speak to the condition of the government of the opposing force.

     The discussion on determining if alternative end-states are counter-productive as they relate to deciding on whether it would be better to pursue an end-state of governmental capitulation was lengthy and cumbersome. Although determining end-states is a necessary function of the planning process for the commitment of military forces, it is also only part of the elements that comprise governmental capitulation. Governmental capitulation, for purposes of this paper, is not the successful accomplishment of meeting end-state goals. Achieving end-state goals through any

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means other than governmental capitulation, such as limited warfare, may be beneficial, but falls short of achieving governmental capitulation over our enemies. Deciding to conduct limited warfare may not achieve governmental capitulation. The execution phase (tactics and operations) of achieving governmental capitulation will be given only cursory discussion. The model or framework I will propose will not be method specific per se, but will provide insight into how and when it could be pursued. Once the decision to pursue governmental capitulation is decided, the war plans of how that victory is to be accomplished is another matter too inclusive for this thesis to fully address.

What this research did include was the pursuit of an end-state of governmental capitulation. Specifically compared were actions that may have resulted in a net increase the in U.S. national security posture than otherwise resulted from the end-state undertaken. In other words, what could have been done differently to increase our security. Also, if any of these documented instances resulted in a less than satisfactory outcome, or in a failure to achieve some or all of the goals originally stated, how did those outcomes affect our security posture.

There are historical examples of wars where governmental capitulation was achieved, where governmental capitulation was not achieved, where deterrence was successful to achieve end-states, where diplomacy was able to affect the desired end-state, and examples where "tolerable peace" was achieved through other methods. Although these examples exist, a compendium making the case for or against pursuing governmental capitulation does not exist.

There are costs (money, lives lost through guerilla war, time, political capital, deployments, etc.,) associated with governmental capitulation and at the conditions where

governmental capitulation should be pursued (regardless of the costs). However, there is little that speaks to the cost savings (such as the estimates of lives saved by dropping the atom bomb on Japan instead of invading the mainland) that pursuing governmental capitulation may realize. The literature review in chapter 3 will detail these examples and costs.

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[1]John Snell, *Illusion and Necessity - The Diplomacy of Global War*, Boston, 1963.

[2]Dennis M. Zink, *How Economics Changed Military Affairs from the 17TH Century to WWI*, December 2002, CGSC Military History Essay (unpublished).

[3]Joint Publication 1: *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington: U.S. DoD, June 1987.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

There were three significant methods of research used to produce this thesis. The first method was the review of literature written to date regarding the range of issues discussed in chapter one. Of note during the literature review were the bibliographies of the other authors. These bibliographies helped to ensure that a wide breadth of literature was covered and served to cross reference any assertions made by the authors.

The second method of research was the opinion survey on governmental capitulation created for this research. This survey provided an opportunity to capture the thoughts and opinions of international officers attending U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, other researchers in the area of national security (including public policy organizations, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the American Enterprise Institute), ordinary citizens living in the U.S., academia, and students in colleges and universities. A copy of the survey can be found at Tab 2 (Survey Instrument) of Appendix B (Survey Results).

The third method of research was the case study method. Appendix C is the evaluation criteria used. This criterion facilitated a uniformed research approach to the more recent historical instances of regime change, unconditional surrender, and governmental capitulation. This criterion was applied to the selected instances used in this research.

These three approaches were filtered by my thesis question "Is there a need for a framework that assists U.S. national security planning for pursuing an end-state of governmental capitulation?" This filter allowed the research to determine the

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appropriateness of U.S. policy in pursuing a course of action to compel another government to capitulate. This filter also allowed the research to determine the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS test) of the mechanics (means) and consequences (benefits and perils) of causing another government to capitulate.

Compelling another government to capitulate is not widely written on. However the literature review did provide insight into the various aspects of international diplomacy, coercion, appeasement, using the various instruments of power, and the historical uses of military force. These discussions varied in tone depending upon the view of the author. In a general sense, the major schools of thought that were prevalent in the writings are those who place diplomacy above all else, those who favor military force "as an extension of politics by other means," those who favor diplomacy, but acknowledge the use of force is necessary in many situations, and those who take an isolationist approach. These schools by no means discredit the writings of the authors, but should be noted to ensure bias does not taint the accuracy of the writings.

Of note during the literature review was the vast amount of information, including opinion or editorial articles, archival data, and previous research available on the World Wide Web. Web research included MSN search engine, Google search engine, military search engines (CALL), and numerous government, academic, and professional archives. Also available on line are library card catalogues, bibliographies, and other reference materials, including the World Book encyclopedia. These references allowed the expansion of the search area and ensured the completeness of the research for articles and materials already published.

Research conducted for the thesis, not previously conducted or published anywhere, was survey research. This survey research provided a wider array of thoughts and opinions on the idea of governmental capitulation. Did the survey respondents feel a country (a sovereign state) should be allowed to force another country (sovereign state) to step down from power? Would respondents' opinion change under various scenarios, such as a state-sponsored attack, or an ineffectual government that is not able to control the exporting of terrorism? These and other similar questions were used as part of the survey research.

The Development and Assessments Directorate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College facilitated the survey research and ensured its validity. To validate the survey, Stephen Isaac and William Michael's handbook in research and evaluation, third edition,[1] and Jack Fraenkel and Norman Wallen's book on how to design and evaluate research, fourth edition[2] were the benchmarks. These books explain the academic standard and helped identify internal threats to validity and controls to eliminate or minimize those threats. The Directorate of Development and Assessments, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College approved the final survey questionnaire.

The survey research question used was: "Should the U.S. have a policy option available to be able to compel another government to capitulate?" This is slightly different than the thesis question – "Is there a need for a framework that assists U.S. national security in planning for pursuing an end-state of compelling another government to capitulate?" The reason for the survey was to determine the appropriateness of compelling other governments to capitulate, rather than the mechanics.

The surveys were mailed out and telephone and informal personal interviews were conducted. Stratums of random sampling among different groups were selected for their particular value based on knowledge in the subject, interest in the subject, and locale. These groups included academia, policy makers, public policy "think tank" organizations, international officers attending CGSC during the 2002-2003 academic year, staff and faculty at CGSC, government policy students at three major universities, and civilians from the Leavenworth, Kansas area.

The questionnaire was developed using a model from the Army Research Institute (ARI). This model consisted of three major task items, several essential elements of analysis (EEAs), which support each of the major task items, and several differently worded questions for each EEA randomly placed in the survey instrument. I used both open-ended questions and opinion scale questions. The major study tasks are below.

Major Study Tasks

1. Determine if governmental capitulation is viable (sovereign right) for the U.S. to use in attaining National Security.

2. Determine how the U.S. develops national will to pursue governmental capitulation when planning to commit forces.

3. Determine the cost versus benefits to the U.S. (international and diplomatic opinion) if it were to pursue a course of governmental capitulation unilaterally.

During the course of formulating the survey several threats to internal validity were found. These were: differential selection of subjects (the inability to have a true random selection due to locale, time constraints, and desire for a portion of respondents to have knowledge in national security policy), lack of a pretest (not being able to

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measure the knowledge of the subjects being surveyed and comparing that to the responses given), measuring instruments (designing unbiased questions and using open ended questions).

To control these threats to internal validity several things were accomplished. To ensure differential selection, as much as possible, a stratified approach was used. That is to say a random sampling from each of the selected populations (international officers, U.S. Army officers, public policy personnel, college students, and civilians) was used. This approach helped with parity of selection of participants within the stratums selected at random. To control lack of a pre-test, a demographic survey embedded within the survey was created and used. This demographic sheet helped to ascertain the education and experience level of the participants and could then be measured against their responses. Finally, to control disparity within the measuring instruments, I converted responses into data points and used the SSPS Data Analysis Program. This program helped me to produce graphs and make generalizations about responses. These graphs are found in tab 1 of appendix B.

The terms used in reporting out survey findings are as follows:

Unanimous—100 percent

Almost unanimous (majority)--97 percent and higher

Extreme majority--85 to 96 percent

Vast Majority--76 to 86 percent

Super Majority--66 to 75 percent

Large Majority--56 to 65 percent

Majority or simple majority--50 to 55 percent

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Less than half--41 to 49 percent

A sizable portion--31 to 40 percent

A notable portion--21 to 39 percent

Some--10 to 20 percent

A few--4 to 9 percent

Statistically Insignificant--less than 4 percent (due to +/- margin of error)

Of note during the survey was the anecdotal information. Several respondents from all strata groups agreed on numerous areas in the objective portion, but disagreed in the subjective (open-ended question) area. These bits of data are included as anecdotal evidence in chapter 5.

Anecdotal information from the case studies is also included in the case study portion of chapter 5. This information, combined with the more traditional scientific analysis of applying the same criteria to a varying group of subjects--in this case countries, provided research results on when capitulation worked, when it did not, what long term effects it had, and what the global environment was like during the period being studied. It should be noted, that sufficient evidence was not available for a detailed analysis of the diplomatic endeavors and attempts at appeasement for all the countries in the research field. However, the information that was available was used as part of the evaluation criteria.

The evaluation criteria used for the country case studies is located in Appendix C "Case Study Evaluation Criteria." These evaluation criteria included a study of actors involved, historical setting, diplomacy, use of force, peace and stability, and international governmental organization involvement. It was specifically designed to show if any

relationship exists between diplomacy and the use of force, and the role that world organizations, such as the UN, play in preventing force from being used to end a particular crisis. The final area of the analysis was the long-term effect from a result of capitulation. While it has been fifty years since some of the countries were changed, and there is ample evidence to show what conditions exist since capitulation, those are the exception. More research will have to be done in the future for those countries that have not been changed for more than twenty or fifty years. It was important to find out what the historical examples of complete victories are, and how could they be studied as a model for application to future situations concerning U.S. national security interests.

Of note during the case studies were the two instances where force was used, but not in relation to causing another government to capitulate. These two instances were Vietnam and Somalia. These countries were added to the field of research to help identify any end-states that were desired, and the methods used to attain those end-states. This data can be found in tab 1 (Country Case Studies) of appendix C (Case Study Criteria).

Appendix A (Framework for Governmental Capitulation) is the framework developed to help analyze pursuit of governmental capitulation as an end-state. This framework is in the form of a matrix detailing specific conditions, situations, elements of concern, internal and external factors, political climate, and estimates on importance of a particular crisis or situation to national security. It analyzes the instruments of national power and highlights areas where efforts can be synchronized for maximum effect. This framework can also be used to analyze the impacts surrounding situations where the use of military force is being considered in the interest of national security.

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The analysis features of the framework came from several sources. For analysis of lessons learned in relation to end-states of recent military operations, I used, as a primary reference tool, the U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned Web Site. The focus was to detail the stated end-state to operations, to determine if the end-state was met, if a different end-state could have been achieved, and how planning for a different end-state may have provided insights into policy formation for the U.S. national security interests of those operations. I also used as a tool Rock's sixteen propositions for appeasement.[3] These propositions, combined with his ideas about national motivation, were quite telling when used to analyze international actors.

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[1]Stephen Isaac and William B. Michael, *Handbook in Research and Evaluation for Education and the Behavioral Sciences,* third edition, EdITS (Educational and Industrial Testing Services), 1995, San Diego, CA.

[2]Jack R. Fraenkel and Norman E. Wallen, *How to design and Evaluate Research in Education*, fourth edition, McGraw Hill, Boston.

[3]Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, The University Press of Kentucky (2000).

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

The important thing in a military operation is victory, not persistence.
                                        Sun Tzu, 6th Century BC

The thesis research for this product is the composite of traditional readings (books, periodicals, and monographs) and web research (lessons learned, speech transcripts, and public debate forums), incorporated with survey research on governmental capitulation, and extensive case study research on victory and complete (or decisive) victory. The design to add victory (complete victory) came as a result of trying to define governmental capitulation as a "victorious" end-state to be thrust upon the losing side. Once this was settled, added to the research was a quest to find the elements that are needed to pursue governmental capitulation, the consequences of it, the historical case studies of when it did and did not work, the difference between limited objectives or limited warfare as a means to attain capitulation, and finally, how a nation builds a will to seek it as an end-state.

The readings and research led to seven main categories of information directly related to what governmental capitulation is as defined above. These are appeasement, diplomacy, victory (and complete victory), regime change (Governmental Capitulation), national will, politics, and end-states.

Appeasement. While there were two books related to appeasement as a means to victory, only one was significant on the virtues of appeasement. The idea of appeasement is vast (especially when discussing compromise) but as a means to achieving victory or some sense of a decisive victory, it is extremely narrow.

University of Kentucky professor, Stephen Rock's read on appeasement,[1]

Appeasement in International Politics, is highly enlightening when talking about

international relations. Why appease, what could be the benefits of appeasement, and

how to implement appeasement strategies are discussed. Other readings agree victory

(desired outcome) was achieved through appeasement, but it was not decisive and did not

produce peace and stability. The research for this thesis indicates appeasement does

achieve a manner of stability, but only for the short-term. Rock disagrees and says that

British appeasement of the U.S. resulted in an unusually strong alliance and long-term

stability between the two countries. Does this mean that Britain achieved victory over the

U.S. or did Britain realize it was in its best interest to work with the U.S. (since the U.S.

was willing) rather than work against it. Can appeasement ever serve as a viable

replacement for governmental capitulation? Rock talks about how governmental

acquiescence is the desire, and getting another government to acquiesce is a victory and

can work to produce stability without toppling governments or using military force. Rock

has sixteen propositions about why and how appeasement will or won't work. He also

has eleven points to consider for policymakers who may decide upon a strategy of

appeasement vis-à-vis a particular adversary. Finally, he discusses the difference between

deterrence (compelling) and appeasement and how they are tied to commitment of the

adversary to its motivation of being insecure or greedy. Rock also outlines several

matrixes of when appeasement would work and what motivations are found in a country

that is the target of appeasement.

John Snell, in his book *Illusion and Necessity - the Diplomacy of Global War

(1939-1945),* writes about realism and illusion in the conduct of foreign policy. He says

Americans believe that problems arise only to be solved--quickly--not to be lived with. He also quotes former president John F. Kennedy "We are destined, all of us here today, to live out most, if not all, of our lives in uncertainty and challenge and peril."[2] That aside, he says France could not count on any assistance from the U.K. or the U.S. so they "had" to appease Hitler and rely on the Maginot Line for their defense. He also says the U.K. could not stand another war (800,000) dead and shipping losses from World War One as an argument why France couldn't count on them. Also there was the looming "threat" of communists. Chamberlain thought Moscow was perfectly happy to have the "Capitalist Powers" tear each other apart whilst staying out of it themselves. The United Kingdom's desire to use Germany as a "strong bulwark" against Russia in Central Europe eventually failed. Poland was also forced to rely on Great Britain for protection and got an agreement from them for this. Germany tried to get Poland to capitulate to its demands and thereby move Great Britain away from its pledge to help Poland. Poland refused and this strategy failed. After Germany invaded Poland, World War Two started.

Snell says that all countries are acting on perceptions towards the other nations. Assumptions based on illusions, denials of facts, and sometimes from necessity (whether real or only perceived). On October 8, 1939, Chamberlain says: "the only chance of peace is the disappearance of Hitler and that is what we are working for."[3] This was the first call for regime change, although it fell short of governmental capitulation (which includes a military victory or surrender). Shortly thereafter the policy of unconditional surrender was adopted.[4]

Diplomacy. There are numerous works on diplomacy and its role in achieving consensus, or coercion, of other nation states. There is much discussion on why

diplomacy fails, what false assumptions were made that aided failure, and what wasn't

taken into account, as diplomatic negotiations were ongoing resulting in failure. There are

also many books on the past successes of diplomacy. Many of the authors in these books

promote diplomacy over war, and highlight actions that could have been taken to prevent

past wars. There is less agreement however, on if and when we should use military force

to protect our national interests, especially if it means acting unilaterally.

Jeffrey Record, in his book *Making War, Thinking History,* describes both the

Weinberger doctrine and the Powell doctrine. These doctrines give the reader insight into

whether or not a nation, specifically the U.S., should use force. He asks what can happen

when force is not used. He cites this case study: In 1938 when Great Britain and France

gave Germany the Sudetenland without a fight, they also gave Hitler boldness. Record

says history and historical analysis should be used when making decisions to use or not

use force. Two analogies are Munich and Vietnam. What is the difference between wars

of necessity and wars of choice? Not since 1945 has there been a war of necessity. "For

the Army" Vietnam became "how" to use force, not whether it could be won, or if even it

should be fought. Record gives three reasons for writing the book, to identify and assess

lessons learned by presidential administrations with regard to Munich and Vietnam; trace

the influences of these lessons in deciding to use force in wars of choice; and assess the

usefulness of Munich and Vietnam analogies in weighing decisions to use or not to use

force. He also talks about the idea of the pendulum swinging as an influence to policy

decisions. He says in WWII nonintervention caused war to become global. In Korea and

Vietnam he says the pendulum swung back in a reaction to aggression at the earliest time

to prevent spread of communism (or risk repeating Munich). He says after Vietnam the

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U.S. realized intervention was wrong so policy swung towards non-intervention. Grenada, Panama, DS/DS, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo caused the pendulum to swing yet again. He says it swung towards intervention, but asserts that may not be such as good thing. "Intervention is OK as long as it is necessary, but it must be necessary."[5]

There is an Army White Paper on Decisive Victory that reads, "As an instrument of American policy, the Army must be ready to provide the nation a variety of tools to influence the international environment and ultimately force a decision." The tools the Army can provide diplomacy are: the threat of use of a competent military to achieve aims; the show of military force to demonstrate resolve, and professional interaction with the Armies of other nations. Page 2 says "the attainment of decisive victory will most likely require the establishment of control, the domination of land and populations through the occupation of terrain." This means when diplomacy requires using military force, "the employment of the Army forces a decision." Page 9 goes on to say: "In most cases, successful military operations will require control of all three operating environments: land, air, and sea. Finally, however, the ability to impose our will depends on the ability to control the land."[6]

Alan Stephenson's essay (CJCS Essays 2002) on coercive diplomacy has several good points regarding war as diplomacy by other means. He states that nation states have two diplomatic options, to convince others, or to coerce others. He says, "limited war can be orchestrated much more precisely to achieve a desired political end-state."[7] He makes the case for using the other pillars of national power (DIME) to coerce rather than solely relying on military. Stephenson also points out that if one chooses coercion there is a

point where war becomes inevitable if the belligerent refuses to succumb, and the state doing the coercion has the will (because of national interest).

Similar to coercive diplomacy is Henry Kissinger's essay on American strategic doctrine and diplomacy. His essay is found in Michael Howard's compilation entitled "*The Theory and Practice of War.*" Kissinger says "Therefore, any assessment on the impact of power on diplomacy must begin with a discussion of the characteristics of power in the nuclear age. These two powers are offensive power--the ability to coerce others, and defensive power--the ability to resist the coercion of others.'[8] Kissinger says war is no longer diplomacy by other means in light of modern nuclear power, rather it is more necessary that diplomacy be effective, or at least reach stalemate.

Victory and Decisive Victory. There are many writings on victories (historical) and how to achieve victory in the future. Readings include narratives on how force of arms can achieve victory that another method could not. Clausewitz simplifies war in his treatise by saying war is just another way that nation states interact. On the strictly military side (military history and military uses of force for deterrence and diplomacy), the readings found range from giving anecdotes about how (former) War Department commanders were making decisions that had national security implications w/out consulting or getting approval from legislative/executive branches, to more studious essays on whether the use of force is justified, and how the military plays a role in international politics. Also on the military side, there are assertions by the U.S. Armed Services who say they are all capable of decisive victory, and that if the military is called upon, it will be able to force a decision.

Colin Powell's book "*My American Journey*," written in 1995, defers war to be the last resort.[9] "War should be the politics of last resort, and when we go to war, we should have a purpose that our people understand and support; we should mobilize our countries resources to fulfill that mission and then go in to win."

General Paul Gorman discusses combined arms in his book "*The secret of future victories*." Training hard and long in a combined arms manner (as well as joint) is his advice. Style should be studied through doctrine, training and force readiness. He promotes two powerful lessons learned from twentieth century warfare: the Republic pays for neglect of its armed forces (what credible deterrence is there from a weak military threat), and aviation (missiles, space based weapons) adds a new "vertical dimension" to war (revolution in military affairs).

Dr. George Gawrych asks is it possible to achieve political success without a military victory? "Israel's impressive battlefield accomplishment in 1967 had failed to bring peace with any Arab state." But later, Egypt pursued limited military actions so that "astute diplomacy would transform military gains into a political victory."[10] These thoughts are from his book "*The 1973 Arab-Israeli war: The Albatross of Decisive Victory*."

Colin Gray, in his book "*Defining and achieving decisive victory*," explores the means and methods most conducive to achievement of decisive victory. He also defines war in a Clausewitzian manner. War is "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."[11] But he quickly adds that if a nation can achieve similar results without the use of force than victory can still be achieved outside of the practice of war. He quotes the famed strategist Edward Luttwak "If the right-thinking are to achieve their great aim of

abolishing war they must first persuade us that victory is futile or, better still, actually harmful."[12] After all a complete and decisive victory would result in "a permanent universal empire and imperium for the victor."[13] The closest thing we can come to achieving complete victory is to limit the number and frequency of crisis. When we render our enemy powerless and can impose our will upon him then we have achieved a victory of opportunity. How to use that opportunity in our national interest can be just as important as the winning of the victory. We have to be careful what call a war because then we have to define what victory will look like when its "won." Gray further discusses what the outcome (victory) of wars have decided: World War One decided Germany would not be a hegemony; World War Two decided that the Nazi adventure would come to an abrupt halt 988 years short of its goal; Korea decided that forcible unification of the peninsula was not worth the costs to either side; Vietnam decided that SVN would not survive as a independent polity; and that U.S. presence stabilized the region for over ten years securing a lasting peace regionally, even though losing the war locally; the Cold War decided that communism would implode (albeit with the help of American clandestine statecraft). Finally, Gray submits this theory: wars can be won or lost, and their outcome can have a significant power of decision for the victor (as an instrument of policy). He defines the types of victory at different levels. There are three tiers of decisive victory: operational, strategic and political. Operational refers to outcome of a campaign. Strategic is "favorable military achievement which forwards achievement of the political object." Political refers to military decision to achieve political aims and goals. "If the political aim in war is a total one-the enemy's overthrow-then it has to be matched with a military effort intended to achieve the complete defeat of

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the foe."[14] What Gray stopped short of discussing was how decisive victory can be translated into desired political effect.

The quest for decisive victory has not changed according to Theodore Wilson.[15] In his book entitled *The Quest for Decisive Victory*, he limits his discussion to purely tactical victories. He says maneuver and pursuit are necessary ingredients for decisive victory on the battlefield. He asserts actions taken before or after victories on the field have no bearing as to whether there actually was a decisive victory. History, however, shows that victories on the battlefield alone do not produce long-term peace and stability. Winning the peace is the real test of victory.

Regime Change (Governmental Capitulation). It is not a new idea. Kingdoms of old invaded, conquered, and took control of land, people and livestock. What has changed in the twentieth century is the motivation behind compelling another government to capitulate. In Haiti and Panama the "regime change" was to restore the legitimate or democratically elected governments. In Vietnam we overthrew the South Vietnamese regime with a U.S. sponsored coup de'taut because it was wavering on allowing the communist insurgency from North Vietnam to go unchecked. Several readings insist the U.S. must be ready to use rapid decisive force for Type I crisis; such as deposing dictators (governmental capitulation).

The George Washington University maintains a National Security Archive, which contains voluminous amounts of electronic data. Among the bits of data relevant to this thesis are the presidential directives on national security since 1950. These directives were matched with foreign policy pronouncements, such as the "Weinberger doctrine, the Powell doctrine, the Lake doctrine, and the limited warfare doctrine (see appendix D,

selected doctrines on the use of force). This match provided better insight into why the use of military force was used in a particular instance. Other bits of data, including searchable databases, relating to U.S. intervention and U.S. led regime changes reside within think tank organization web sites (such as RAND, CSIS, Foreign Relations Council and American Enterprise Institute). Numerous news organizations (Christian Science Monitor, MSNBC, Z Magazine) have archived data, detailing regime change and foreign policy decisions.

The Conference Report of its 16th Annual ISSP (International Security Studies Program) entitled Protracted warfare-the third world arena: a dimension of the U.S.-Soviet Conflict, is a good read on the Reagan administration's doctrine of "Pro-active containment policy." This policy included the use of insurgencies as a means to change regimes (to become democratic or pro-western). One contributor noted that for the policy to be effective it had to contain 4 essential elements: restoration or establishment of democratically oriented government, economic development, dialogue through diplomacy, and an adequate defense structure.

There are several books on U.S. Grant and why he was nicknamed "Unconditional Surrender Grant."[16] Robert Marrin's book on Grant does a good job discussing Grant's two-pronged strategy during the civil war. He wanted to hold Lee in the north, and effect the attrition of the Confederacy by using Sherman to march through the south. Marrin also discusses Grant's mindset why he demands unconditional surrender of opposing generals on the battlefield. In Grant's way of thinking if you are to bring a conflict to a rapid end, you must push for complete and decisive victory through

unconditional surrender. This includes the surrender, or capitulation, of the leaders of the opposing side.

Richard Immerman's collection of essays, specifically chapter 7 "John Foster Dulles and the Peace Settlement with Japan," written by Seigen Miyasato, provides a good historical background on the peace settlement (and end of American occupation) signed in 1950--not 1945 as is widely assumed (the peace treaty was signed--not the peace settlement). Several issues weighed heavily on the decision to effect a peace settlement. The U.S. was leery of Soviet overtures and of Japanese rearmament, while the Japanese were tiring of occupation. In formulating the settlement, Dulles remembered his lessons from the failed Treaty of Versailles--don't impose severe economic restrictions because that breeds vengeance, and it is often necessary to make compromises due to political realities [17]. Through careful study of the problem, Dulles was able to get State and Defense to agree. Japan would attain sovereignty, the right to rearm (for defense and collective--UN--security purposes), and end to occupation--except for skeleton crew to demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect Japan from communist incursions.

Brian Bond, in his book "*The Pursuit of Victory*," writes, "if victory is often costly, defeat is always worse."[18] He cites DESERT STORM where we achieved "triumph" without victory. He also cites cases throughout history where military victories (on the filed of battle) didn't always lead to peace and stability (especially when used to conquer *and occupy* other nations- my emphasis).

On the issue of American intervention in the affairs of other countries, the point-counterpoint book "*American Foreign Policy, Opposing Viewpoints*" provides two essays on the benefits and perils of intervention (without specifically detailing the level of

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intervention). Bienen and Krauthammer's essays primarily discuss the Reagan Doctrine (of intervention), but are good resources for understanding what, if any, limits there are to American power, and what is likely to be the result of too much influence (from exercising that power).

End-state of Peace and Stability. This should be defined as what one nation wants the other nation, especially a belligerent nation, to look like or to be doing at the end of hostilities or after diplomatic agreements have been reached. A well thought out end-state includes strategic, operational and tactical arenas. It also encompasses political, diplomatic, and economic conditions. For instance in the case of North Korean aggression, an end-state would include DPRK allowing unfettered access to plutonium producing nuclear plants, having all DPRK forces north of the 38th parallel, removing the ruling DPRK party--or junta--from power, creating an environment for a popularly elected body to govern, and possibly destroying the military forces so that the belligerent cannot conduct medium or large scale military operations. Diplomacy can be used to achieve some, but not all elements of the end-state.

While a good number of authors and diplomats agree the U.S. needs to have a strong military capability to provide validity to diplomatic and other national security endeavors, not all agree on when to use military force, and what outcomes (end-states) should be pursued.

BG (Ret) Huba Wass de Czege writes in his article "*Toward a strategy of positive ends*" that there should be a U.S. foreign policy that enables the U.S. to define its vital interests in terms of conditions--such as peace, freedom, rule-of-law, and economic prosperity--rather than as the containment or defeat of inimical state or nonstate actors.

This strategy would build and enlarge a circle of stakeholders committed to creating

conditions for profitable and enduring peace. Rather than having to put out a fire, as a

group of nations acting in cooperation, we eliminate the causes of the fire. We do this

through increased engagement. Partnership for Peace, organization for security and

cooperation in Europe (OCSE) is one example. But authors admit crisis response may be

necessary in two forms: type I forceful intervention (where threat of major war breaking

out isn't present) and we should use the "*coup de main*"[19] approach (decisive force even

if only to achieve limited political objectives; such as enforce, regain control of, defeat,

or reinstate). Type II have apparent potential for vertical or lateral escalation, but that

directly challenge the vital interests of the U.S. and its allies. He says even though war

may escalate, we must do something about type II but not necessarily remove the

belligerent regime (especially if they posses the means to launch a retaliatory strike with

nukes). Must be concerted allied effort phased in and with the will to fight and win

deliberate campaigns. The U.S. must do more to create and maintain conditions that

promote long-tern peace and prosperity.

Manfred K. Rotermund wrote in his book, "*The fog of peace: finding the end-state of hostilities*," that the end of hostilities is not the end of danger, rather it is the

beginning of a transition to peace. A victory is certainly not peace itself. He writes: peace

arrives only when domestically centered progress is established in a post-conflict

environment.

As the editor-in-chief for MSNBC news foreign affairs department, Preston

Mendenhall has invariably reviewed voluminous information on lasting peace and

stability. In his article about the Afghanistan regime change after one year, dated October

2003, he discusses the necessary elements for lasting victory (lasting peace and stability).[20] Among the elements needed for Afghans to prosper are; security forces (external peacekeeping forces until the central government can perform that function) to keep rival factions, or tribes, under control; expanding agriculture and employment; and foreign aid until Afghanistan can be economically rebuilt.

National Will. Through several readings it was possible to define what generates national will to use military force; such as an attack on our national interests and citizens (shipping during WWII, Pearl Harbor, terrorism attacks against our embassies). Some literature discussed how we failed to generate the will to use force (Harry Summers' look at the U.S. failure in Vietnam is one such read). Two other readings highlighted problems with persistence in maintaining national will (Mark Arens and Michael Pearlman).

Charles Maynes' article on the prospects for order or disorder discusses the revolution in communication that is making ordinary citizens aware of world events.[21] This awareness often intrudes into the government's foreign policy decision making. "The line between domestic and foreign policy is being erased and ordinary people are insisting that they have a voice in the affairs of the state." With the end of the cold war there is less need for extraordinary measures of secrecy by the government, and there should be more opportunity for greater democratic control of foreign policy. When stirred by aggressive attacks from a belligerent, passion can dominate actions and produce the will for military action.

Michael Pearlman, in his study on why the U.S. used the Atomic bomb in Japan, highlights the problems the U.S. faced in maintaining national will after VE (Victory in Europe) Day. He says there was a large push to demobilize the armed forces, to "bring

the boys back home," and that there was concern continued fighting--by invading more of the heavily defended islands--would produce "too many casualties," which may have led to the U.S. people reversing the demand for unconditional surrender.[22]

Mark Arens' thesis on the planning for Operation OLYMPIC also discusses how unconditional surrender could only be accomplished through occupation of Japan, and not until the middle or latter part of 1946. Combined with the staggering losses expected to be taken for the invasion of mainland Japan, planners were concerned that America didn't have the will to continue fighting for much longer.[23]

Politics. On the political side, there are numerous works detailing U.S. national politics, decisions made for political reasons, constitutional concerns with the use of force, how best to pursue end-states, and why there should be limits of using force. Some of the readings touch on the perils associated with not having clearly defined objectives, and how domestic politics often plays a role in U.S. Forces being committed in "half-baked" fashion. Other political readings include studies of other governments and how they politically determine to use force, how they define end-states, and how or if they are concerned about governmental capitulation.

Jeffrey Record and Robert Hanks, editors of Foreign Policy Report on U.S. Strategy at the crossroads: two views, write contrary opinions on the use of force for political reasons. Hanks outlines the elements of U.S. National Strategy: "History teaches that without the underpinning provided by credible armed power . . . diplomatic injunctions run extremely high risks of failure."[24] He goes on to say, "Even the most carefully crafted diplomatic warnings or demarches are ineffectual if the propounding nation lacks the military strength to back them up." Even if the nation possesses

abundant military power, it must also have the will to use that power. In Vietnam the U.S. clearly had the military strength, but not the will, in the form of waging a total war. U.S. efforts to force the NVA to stop acting belligerent towards the south were unsuccessful because the U.S. lacked the will to escalate the conflict to pursue greater aims (like invading the north). In the end, the NVA protracted the conflict long enough for the U.S. to decide to withdraw. Hanks also discusses the Nixon Doctrine. He paraphrases the doctrine by saying the U.S. should be judicious in application of military power to meet its global role; there should be a greater degree of burden sharing by U.S. allies in the defense of their own land; American help in the creation of independent power centers to maintain local stability (has the added effect as a means for securing U.S. interests abroad). Maritime-based forward deployed forces best serve this military might. Must be able to deploy and use in convincing manner rapidly.

A good read on civil-military (armed forces and civilian leadership) relationships, and the need to have a viable relationship, is the Strategic Services Institute's (SSI) collection of essays entitled "Civil-Military Relations." This work, edited by Vincent Davis, discusses how decisions are arrived at (post cold war) when deciding to use military force (or forces in LIC or PKO roles). Of note is the article by Don Snider, page 11, regarding end-states. Regarding end-states, Snider quotes from the Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook "If something is unclear . . . have it explained or redefined."[25] He goes on to explain how there is a communication gap when deciding to use, and deciding when to stop using, military forces in attaining victory or success. Commanders are not being told when they have met the strategic goals. He also says while mission creep--the art of changing a commander's mission--is inevitable, it should only occur at

lower echelons. Changing the strategic aims or goals in the middle of a conflict without

proper planning and resourcing can be disastrous (as in Somalia).

[1]The only framework or theory of how to implement appeasement found. Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, University Press of Kentucky, 2000.

[2]Snell, John, *Illusion and Necessity - The Diplomacy of Global War*, Boston, 1963.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ulysses S. Grant is widely believed to be the first to use the term. Edwin C. Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender: The Fall of Fort Donaldson*, Tennessee Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXI, March 1962.

[5]Jeffery Record, *Making War, Thinking History*, Naval Institute Press, 2002.

[6]Army White Paper, *Decisive Victory: America's Power Projection Army*, 1996.

[7]Stephenson must have read former secretary of defense McNamara's essay on graduated pressure. McNamara claims graduated pressure caused the Soviets to "blink" during the Cuban missile crisis. Alan Stephenson, *Shades of Gray: Gradual Escalation of the use of Force*, CJCS Essays 2002, National Defense University.

[8]Michael Howard, editor, *The Theory and Practice of War*, Indiana University Press, 1975.

[9]Colin Powell, *My American Journey*, A Ballentine book, Random House, New York, 1995.

[10]Dr. George W. Gawrych, *The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory*, The Leavenworth Papers, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army CGSC, 1996.

[11]Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976, page 76.

[12]Colin S. Gray, *defining and achieving complete victory*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Theodore A. Wilson, *Quest for Decisive Victory*," University Press of Kansas, 2002.

[16]Albert Marin, *Unconditional Surrender: U.S. Grant and the Civil War*, Simon and Schuster, 1994, page 102.

[17]Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, Princeton University Press, 1990, page 194.

[18]Brian Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory*, Oxford University Press, 1996, page 199.

[19]Huba Wass de Czege, *Towards a Strategy of Positive Ends*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2001, page 19.

[20]Preston Mendenhall, *Afghan 'regime change' one year on*, MSNBC news, October 7, 2003.

[21]Charles Maynes, *The World in the Year 2000: Prospects for Order or Disorder*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 4th Annual Strategy Conference, Feb 1993.

[22]Michael D. Pearlman, *Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb*, CSI, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

[23]Mark Arens, *V Corps Amphibious Planning for OPERATION Olympic*, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1996.

[24]Jeffery Record and Robert Hanks, *U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads: Two Views*, Foreign Policy Report, July 1982, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., page 46.

[25]Vincent Davis, *Civil-Military Relations and the Not-Quite wars of the Present and Future,* Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1996.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

Research evidence was analyzed and interpreted using the three criteria described in chapter 2 (Methodology). There were insightful and relevant findings captured as part of the survey research. Responses from this survey indicated governmental capitulation would be an appropriate course of action for the U.S. to pursue in the interest of national security. For national security reasons, the U.S. has pursued governmental capitulation in the past. The literature reviewed was relevant and explained why and how governmental capitulation was accomplished. A case study model (appendix C) applied to several historical examples helped evaluate the results or effects produced by governmental capitulation, if any. The combined study of the survey data, literature review, and case studies, not only helped form the conclusions in chapter 5, but also provided the elements used to produce the "Framework for Governmental Capitulation" (appendix A).

The thrust of the research methodology was simultaneously to attain practical experience in survey research methods and then to incorporate that methodology with other methods of study. This allowed for anecdotal evidence from the survey participants to be used along with reviews of literature and studies already completed regarding the subject at hand. In interpreting the findings from the survey, only those findings that are representative of a particular group, stated as such, will be used. For example, the survey data revealed that the vast majority (81 percent) of U.S. Army majors attending CGSC felt that the U.S. had the "sovereign" right (unilaterally if necessary) to compel another government to capitulate (regime change) if that government used chemical or biological weapons against the U.S.

What you will not find is data used in a broad-brush approach to prove any particular point. Broad brush approaches, such as: "A majority (55 percent) of respondents felt that governmental capitulation was acceptable," hide data points of demographic strata. That is to say that the generalization of 55 percent approval of governmental capitulation hides data from the various demographic groups, such as the International Officers. These officers (68 percent) stated disagreement with a policy of governmental capitulation. In the demographic section, and where appropriate, there will be comprehensive analysis from the survey data. That is to say it includes breakouts of demographic and subject. For example, 22 percent of the survey respondents are not of U.S. nationality, but the vast majority of all respondents (82 percent) felt the U.S. has not done a good job in declaring what the end-state was in past uses of military force (see chapter 5 conclusions). Rather than saying "The majority said this or feel this way," all analysis will directly correlate to a demographic or assertion specifically stated as such. However, where statistically appropriate, data points are used in conjunction with each specific topic within the thesis and survey data and will be referenced in that regard. For example, in defining if the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation if attacked with nuclear weapons, a vast majority (83 percent) of all respondents felt the U.S. could act in responding to the attack. This analysis is without regard to any demographic profile because the generalization does not hide any significant points of data.

The literature studied lacks uniformity in defining victory and decisive victory. Several authors frame of reference for victory or decisive victory is pure military competition without any thought as to the political structure. "My army beat your army (or my navy beat your navy) and therefore I have won victory. If my army routs or

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completely destroys your army (or navy) then I have achieved decisive victory."[1] Yet

still more authors think the way to achieve peace and stability is through victory over the

military; but not necessarily over the government. Some say that peace can be won by

achieving military victory alone. It cannot.

> In Casablanca, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt insisted on the unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy and Japan. There would be no peace with the Nazis, Fascists, or Imperial Japanese, only a complete surrender. The eventual surrender was followed by a period of rebuilding and today; Germany, Italy and Japan are amongst the most peaceful, democratic, and industrious nations on earth.[2]

Other authors look at victory and decisive victory at the strategic level. For

instance some say the peace that we have enjoyed since the end of WWII was the result

of victory, or decisive victory over the governments of Germany and Japan (but not

necessarily over their militaries, i.e. Japan).

Chuck Morse indicates that you have to defeat more than just the military on the

field of battle; you must defeat the regime and the ideology that formed the regime, and

replace it with a "democratic" ideology and form of government.[3]

As defined in chapter 1, this paper looks at governmental capitulation (regime

change) as a method to achieve peace and stability. It should be noted that governmental

capitulation could be effected without a military victory (or the use of force). A look at

Haiti in 1994 shows the ruling military party stepped down solely on the basis of a

credible military threat. Regime change was effected and the democratically elected ruler

(Aristede) was returned to power. Critics will argue that Haiti is not a model for peace

and stability regardless of how regime change came about. The U.S. position however, is

that Haiti is stable, and U.S. forces are no longer needed to maintain order.[4] In this case,

governmental capitulation did affect a positive set of circumstances and set the stage for peace and stability (long term).

<center>Analysis from the Survey Research</center>

The survey is reflective of the sampling population only and has a margin for error of +/- 5 percent. It is not held alone to push a particular policy, rather in the context of this study (added to literature review and country case studies) it is illustrative of the possibilities and perils associated with any particular policy.

The survey research and population numbers are as follows: 220 surveys were distributed, 107 received back (an impressive return rate of 48 percent). Of the people answering questions, 106 people answered all of them, 1 respondent answered none of them. Seventy respondents were CGSC Students (thirty-one International Officers and thirty-nine U.S. Military), six were from public policy organizations (think tanks), thirteen were civilians from the town of Leavenworth, Kansas, six were college students, eight were U.S. Army enlisted soldiers, and four were academia. The random strata as proposed in the research methodology of chapter 2 were met.

The assessment software program used to compile and produce the appendixes was SSPS version 8.0. The SSPS program provided data verified by the N-Par test and the Kurslak-Wallis test. The results and tests of margin for error are in accordance with these tests processed by the SSPS program.

The significant findings from the Likert scale questions are as follows. The largest area of agreement (96 percent of all respondents) regarded the perils of not properly defining end-states. These respondents (all demographics) agreed that the U.S. should be concerned with the effects resulting from pursuing its end-states. A slightly smaller

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number of all respondents (82 percent) said that the U.S. should also be very concerned about the negative effects resulting from pursuing an end-state short of capitulation. In one finding regarding the defining of end-states, the vast majority (82 percent--all demographics) said U.S. Government end-states have not been clearly defined or understood. These findings seem to indicate the respondents generally agree to the following assertions: 1. The U.S. has not clearly defined its end-states. 2. The U.S. should fully define--taking into account the effects--its end-states fully. 3. The U.S. should be concerned of possible negative effects if it pursues an end-state short of governmental capitulation.

The second largest area of agreement of all demographics regarded justifying capitulation. The vast majority (83 percent) of respondents said governmental capitulation could be justified for reasons of national security. In this area there was more agreement in response to attacks from WMD, and less for economic or diplomatic reasons. Overall, a super majority (66 percent--all demographics) agreed the U.S. should have a policy of governmental capitulation. Not surprisingly, the same number of respondents (all demographics) desired for governmental capitulation to be used only as a last resort. These findings seem to indicate the respondents generally agree to the following assertions: 1. Pursuing an end-state of governmental capitulation is acceptable in the interest of national security. 2. The U.S. should have a policy to pursue capitulation. 3. Pursuing governmental capitulation should only be undertaken as a last resort.

Anecdotal Evidence and Analysis

One respondent said the U.S. had the right to act in its defense, even preemptively if necessary. This includes pursuing a course of action that brings the belligerent government "to its knees." Another respondent, not nearly as hawkish, said the U.S. only has "rights given to it by the international community, specifically the UN, and that any security issues must be pursued there first."

These varying tones were more prevalent when viewed in context with the survey demographics. The respondents most likely to indicate the UN was important when dealing with international security issues, tended to be international officers attending CGSC. The respondents indicating the U.S. had a sovereign right to act with force (unilaterally if necessary) tended to be U.S. citizens. The following are samples of responses to the open ended questions.

1. Governmental capitulation provides a deterrent effect for future crises.

2. A coalition working towards capitulation is the shortest way to get rid of an evil government.

3. Peace becomes defined by the conquering nation, not the conquered

4. A lack of a clear, well-articulated policy prevents pursuing G.C.

5. May not solve the root problem for aggressive nature of a country.

6. (U.S.) Congress is read in and supports the action.

7. 3 tests: grave danger; will of people, and international recognition of danger.

8. Capitulation without an end-state is meaningless.

9. Loss of credibility among allies and a misunderstanding of intentions.

10. To prevent a war being considered by a (hostile) regime.

11. The plan must be sound, moral and justified and must have an end-state.

12. Need a framework or model that supports and re-enforces our alliances prior to pursuing G.C.

Analysis from the Literature Review

Analysis of the literature shows it to be incomplete when discussing the need for governmental capitulation. The evidence is also lacking when looked at to determine the elements needed for a model or framework to facilitate decision making when a crisis arises that may require governmental capitulation. While there is some discussion on the benefits derived from regime change and total military victories, there is not anything that discusses whether we should or shouldn't pursue governmental capitulation. There is scant literature discussing other countries points of view with regard to if the U.S. should be allowed to pursue capitulation (does the U.S. have the sovereign right) as a national security policy. Finally, a compendium of doctrines regarding international relations does not exist. However, for purposes of this study a compendium was created, and can be found at Appendix D.

There were three significant findings from the literature review. These were, a study on how and why appeasement would work to ensure stability, a study on protecting national security interests that would lead to the possibility of using military force, and a study on how and why past instances of unconditional surrenders worked to produce peace and stability.

Research on governmental capitulation revealed pursuing this course of action is not without perils. The conquering force or nation assumes a wide variety of responsibilities for the populace of the nation it conquered. Research on defining end-

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states and objectives, either in conjunction with the decision to use force, or after deciding to use force, also revealed two things. First, that courses of action (COAs) embarked upon to achieve limited aims, specifically those COAs achieving something short of governmental capitulation, did not ensure peace and stability. Second, that diplomacy is the most preferred method of resolving conflicts (not counting war as diplomacy by other means), but, diplomacy in and of itself isn't effective for ensuring long term peace and stability. Diplomacy is shown to work best when re-enforced with the threat of credible military force (such as in the case of Haiti) to achieve peace and stability.

The primary tool for diplomacy in the modern era is the United Nations. Comprised of a general assembly and sub councils, such as the Security Council, the UN endeavors to maintain peace and stability. However, by its own charter, it allows nations to defend themselves in the interest of their national security. Article 51 provides nations the right to self-defense. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."[5]

Nation states acting in self-defense must report immediately to the Security Council their reasons. Nations failing to provide sufficient cause for their use of force risk a myriad of sanctions from the UN Security Council or the UN general assembly. These sanctions however, have not been effective in deterring aggression. In such cases, the UN Security Council can, and does, authorize the use of force from a collective body of countries willing to send armed forces. There are no historical examples where the UN has achieved long-term peace and stability after authorizing the use of force. Korea was a

stalemate, Somalia was an abject failure, and the Hussein regime remained in power in Iraq.

Analysis from the Country Case Studies

Case study analysis revealed governmental capitulation has produced long-term peace and stability. Japan is one example of this idea. Unconditional surrender was achieved, and then the country was rebuilt in the form of a free nation. This free nation provided individual liberties and rights to its populace. The granting of individual liberties and rights increased a sense of personal worth among each individual citizen. By increasing the personal worth of its citizens, Japan became an industrious, safe and stable country. This environment expanded to include the region and the international community, thus producing long-term peace and stability.

In the Germany study there are two sections: post World War One (Treaty of Versailles and the cease-fire) and post World War Two (Marshall Plan and unconditional surrender). These two cases highlighted the differences in the same country where stability was not attained because of the limited objectives of the war, and where stability was attained after capitulation.

After the First World War the German government was left intact, but levied with heavy reparations. These reparations left a bad taste in the mouths of Germans who felt they were not responsible for the war and who felt they did not really lose the war. A man named Hitler came to power and exploited these feelings. What followed became known as the Second World War. After World War Two the German government was changed and the country set on a different course. This different course has provided long-term peace and stability since 1945.

Other examples of governmental capitulation--Kosovo (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonian), Haiti, Grenada, and Panama--demonstrate that alone, or with other entities (nations or organizations like NATO), peace and stability can be a result of the use of military force to pursue an end-state of capitulation. Panama is an exception since it was undertaken by unilateral U.S. action. Although some nations later complained, they now recognize peace and stability is prevalent since the Noriega regime capitulated.

History also has examples of uses of military force that didn't work so well. These are Iraq (after the invasion of Kuwait), Vietnam, North Korea, and Somalia. Unconditional surrender was not attempted, nor was it achieved. Some of these ruling parties continue to create chaos and instability in the region where they live. They often deny their people human rights, suffrage, freedoms of any sort, such as speech and the press, and typically have poor economies. International pressures can be used to keep them from becoming hostile, but not always. Readings and historical accounts indicate that if these hostile regimes are not properly dealt with, they tend to cause even more instability.

Evaluating interaction among the three research methods.

In researching this thesis, it became apparent there was interaction among the three research methods. Specifically, the survey research revealed opinions of the respondents similar to assertions made in various texts. The case study analysis supported assertions forwarded in certain texts as well. The survey research correlated the case studies by defining the historical examples that advise the respondents as part of history.

The survey analysis supported the literature analysis in the following ways:

1. Finding: a super majority (66 percent) of all respondents believed that governmental capitulation could be used to protect U.S. security interests. This right to self-defense, as allowed by customary international law, is documented throughout history and in much of the literature.

2. Finding: A majority (54 percent) of all respondents agreed that governmental capitulation should be pursued only as part of an UN mandate. The literature and periodicals support this conclusion by discussing the perils of unilateral action, and the possibility of fomenting bad relations with the international community.

3. Finding: The vast majority (82 percent) of all respondents said end-states were not clearly identified prior to the use of military force. Much of the literature discusses the lack of defined end-states from U.S. uses of force.

The case study analysis supports the literature analysis in the following ways.

1. Finding: The U.S. has conducted governmental capitulation in the interest of its national security. These achievements have improved national security.

2. Finding: Where governmental capitulation was not pursued or achieved even though military forces were used, U.S. national security was not improved.

3. Finding: Governmental capitulation has produced long-term peace and stability in the cases of Germany, Grenada, Panama, and Kosovo.

4. Finding: In the past, the U.S. has not planned for governmental capitulation at the outset of a crisis, but later did achieve governmental capitulation. The

literature and historical analysis indicates the U.S. did not clearly articulate its end-states and objectives when it used military force.

5. Survey analysis supports case study analysis in the following ways:

6. Finding: In the open-ended portion of the survey, many respondents indicated the U.S. achieved governmental capitulation in the past and it has enhanced U.S. national security. Several respondents specifically cited Germany and Japan.

7. Finding: In the open-ended portion of the survey, eight respondents indicated the U.S. was justified (had a sovereign right) in pursuing governmental capitulation. The case studies demonstrated U.S. authority, under customary international law, to act.

Validating the Research

Further analysis was conducted to determine if the research outcomes are valid and if there are different conclusions provided by other research efforts. As stated previously, survey research to determine how the U.S. determines end-states and if governmental capitulation is a viable course of action is almost non-existent. The little that does exist is in the form of opinion polls on whether we should effect regime change in Iraq. The measures of effectiveness for those opinion polls could not be ascertained.

In evaluating the evidence and analyzing the research data, it is noteworthy to mention how the findings captured as part of the survey support those findings of the other research methods. The literature review was the strongest leg of research, as it was ultimately supported by both the case studies and the survey. The hard part was in trying to apply the historical examples and to create a model that could help evaluate long-term

peace and stability by means of governmental capitulation. In the end, the combined

study of the survey data, literature review and case studies, provided the elements found

in the "Framework for Governmental Capitulation" (appendix A).

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[1]This extrapolation comes from Edward Creasy's *Fifteen most Decisive battles in History,* from Theodore Wilson's *Quest for decisive Victory*, and from Hew Strachan's *European Armies and the Conduct of War.*

[2]Chuck Morse, *Unconditional Surrender*, Copyright 2000, 2001 - City Metro Enterprises.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Noam Chomsky, *Democracy Restored*, Z-Magazine, November 1994.

[5]UN Charter, Article 51, from the UN website, www.un.org.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Thesis research on governmental capitulation revealed this is not a new doctrine or policy. As a last resort, the U.S. has compelled other governments to capitulate in the past. In most cases, the U.S. pursued this end-state because of the greater peril associated with not acting. U.S. national security can be at risk if a belligerent state or trans-national actor threatens our interests. Pursuing governmental capitulation is a method of securing national security. There are many benefits an end-state of governmental capitulation can bring. However, pursuing governmental capitulation is foolhardy without proper planning. Proper planning provides the most options to achieve the desired end-state as well as setting the desired conditions to ensure long-term peace and stability. There is a need for a framework that assists U.S. national security planners in pursuing an end-state of governmental capitulation.

Admittedly, even the best planning cannot ensure long-term peace and stability; therefore, further research is needed on how to achieve long-term peace and stability. It is possible that incorporating democratic ideals may be the only vehicle to achieve long-term peace and stability. In his article, *The End of Civilization*, Francis Fukuyama says history is over because of "the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."[1] Fukuyama insists the ideal of democracy has taken over as the controlling global ideology and will eventually replace other forms of governance. This replacement will cause the "unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism."[2] That is not to say that conflicts won't erupt. But when they do, long-term

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peace and stability should be the strategic aim, even if it means replacing belligerent governments.

Governmental capitulation is not without perils. The international community must be taken into account when planning to pursue governmental capitulation. Proper use of an information operations (IO) campaign plan, conducted prior to and simultaneous with planning, can help alleviate international concerns. Regardless of the effectiveness of the IO plan, international reaction and the U.S. long-term standing in the world must be weighed against the necessity for acting. With U.S. unilateral action, the danger increases that the UN will be perceived as becoming irrelevant. This may cause other states to think they can use force if they perceive their national security to be in danger. China's desire to unify with Taiwan is one such example. By pursuing governmental capitulation, the U.S. must be concerned that other nation states do not follow suit.

Unilateral actions by any nation state may also cause the escalation of other international crises. For example, if India and Pakistan continue to fight over Kashmir, and one of these nations decides to push for capitulation of the other, the world could witness a repeat of the 2000 nuclear brinkmanship. Other perils associated with unilateral action are the cost to current alliances. Would NATO become irrelevant if it chose not to participate in military action deemed to be in the interest of international security. The danger of possibly causing damage to alliances must be weighed when deciding what actions to take in resolving a crisis.

Other perils or costs associated with governmental capitulation include a lengthy occupation, costs of reconstruction, the possibility of an insurgency, and meeting the

basic life necessities. An insurgency could prove costly in terms of the lives of the occupying force (our "national treasure" as one survey respondent said). Meeting basic life necessities can be daunting logistically and can become a public relations nightmare if not done correctly.

While there may be perils, there are also possibilities. Governmental capitulation provides the potential for long-term peace and stability. It provides the potential for economic prosperity, the potential for increase in the value of individual freedoms and protection of human rights, and is the best chance for democratic ideals to take hold within a country.

Other tangible benefits include the potential for the elimination of WMD, reduction of state sponsored terrorism, control of trans-national actors by removing their operating bases and safe havens, and control over warring factions and ethnic conflicts. The more basic benefits of freedom on navigation, access to raw materials and open markets, as well as regional cooperation through increased interaction.

There is danger in the decision not to act. The implications of not pursuing governmental capitulation, in favor of something short--like limited war--increases the chances for failure and does not increase the national security posture of the U.S. Several instances occur in history where the U.S. committed military forces without pursuing governmental capitulation and it did not produce peace and stability. Examples of this are Cuba, DPRK (North Korea), Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq.

Policy makers and planners must recognize governmental capitulation as a legitimate course of action and use a framework that advises planning at the outset of a

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crisis. This framework must also incorporate an information operations (IO) plan for both internal (U.S. populace) and external (international) audiences.

This thesis research has provided an analysis of when or if compelling another government to capitulate is the best course of action. Reasons for pursuing this course vary, and include violations of human rights, economic tyranny, use, proliferation, or procurement of WMD, and violations of civil liberties (such as negating by military force free and fair elections).

It should be noted that policy makers and planners are able to plan and pursue governmental capitulation simultaneous with other instruments of national power. Knowing the U.S. has this policy option will enhance other diplomatic overtures by providing a credible threat of military force for egregious acts against the international community.

The research question for this thesis was "Is there a need for a framework that assists U.S. National Security planning for pursuing an end-state of Governmental Capitulation?" The answer is yes. This thesis research has revealed how the roots of strategy, diplomacy, peace, and security intertwine to reveal the models or frameworks that best detail what courses of action can be taken when nations are faced with crises or dilemmas. The resolution of these crises, caused by failed nation states, dictators, anarchistic regimes, illegitimate rulers or warlords, may require governmental capitulation. It is essential that planning, using a coherent framework, begin at the outset of the crisis.

Victory (on the field of battle) endows the conqueror with the ability to dictate terms to the vanquished. But only through Ulysses S. Grant's design of unconditional

surrender[3] by the ruling authorities, can a victor set the stage for what happens after the cessation of hostilities. Victory (*unconditional surrender*) must be achieved after the decision to use military force of arms is made. That victory must be over both the military on the field and over the government controlling the military. The unconditional surrenders of Germany and Japan are two examples in this regard. President Roosevelt's goal of achieving peace by "depriving Germany and Japan of all military power,"[4] and pursuing the unconditional surrender of not just the military, but the government as well, was the result of the lessons learned from the "cease-fire" at the end of WWI. Germany was not defeated unconditionally. It retained a large fighting force and a governmental structure that reconstituted itself to fight another day. During Roosevelt's "unconditional surrender" conference, the Allied Powers committed to ensuring destruction of Germany's and Japan's ability to make war for a long time to come. Arguably this desire to pursue capitulation has had lasting effects on peace and stability since that time.

Unconditional surrender[5] in Germany was the complete and total destruction of the military, government, and civil structure. By 1943, the Allied Powers were planning to put an occupation force inside of Germany for years to come, if for no other reason than to show Germany how badly they had been beaten.[6]

Similarly, the Japanese unconditional surrender, brought about by the use of two atomic bombs, allowed the Allied forces to set the terms for peace. It also allowed for a smaller U.S. presence post-war.[7] Of key importance was showing the populace we weren't going to conquer or build an empire, rather to force surrender to end the aggression of the Imperialistic Regime.

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The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen form the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.[8]

The Germany and Japan examples describe for military planners the desired outcome or end-state of hostilities. This end-state helps provide the definition of governmental capitulation. "Governmental capitulation is the situation in a country at the national level, where the ruling authorities are removed from power, the government does not control the country, the military is destroyed or rendered incapable of conducting medium or large scale operations, and the populace is subjected to martial law by the conquering, and subsequently occupying, force."[9] It includes regime change, but stops short of eradicating culture, heritage and identity of the citizens of the occupied country.

In recent U.S. history, there are several instances whereby the United States has committed military forces, in an attempt to achieve its national security purposes, without having an end-state of governmental capitulation. These endeavors have not produced the kind of peace and stability the U.S. had hoped for (Iraq, Somalia, Vietnam, Bosnia). The pursuit of an end-state of governmental capitulation may have resulted in a more beneficial national security posture than otherwise resulted from the policy undertaken. This is bore out in the recent successes where governmental capitulation became the goal

of the use of military force, as in Panama and Yugoslavia, even though not originally designed.[10]

Acts such as state sponsored terrorism, attacks on U.S. citizens home and abroad with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and direct military action against the U.S. and its global interests, are just some of the reasons a course of governmental capitulation may be warranted. The U.S. has pursued governmental capitulation since World War Two, albeit as an afterthought to U.S. policy. Military planners and elected officials fall short of designing a framework that can be used to analyze when, or if, compelling another government to capitulate is the best course of action. When the U.S. seeks governmental capitulation through the use of military force, that end-state must be fully planned and prepared for.

The U.S. demonstrated the need to compel these governments to capitulate. The U.S. felt it was necessary to have a complete military victory (not just over the army on the field of battle, but a total defeat of a government or regime by military force) to achieve peace and stability. There are some clear advantages and disadvantages in pursuing end-states of governmental capitulation.

Historical examples show how unconditional surrender was used to set a course of peace and stability. Peace and stability can be defined as a regime or government controlling a country in a manner that is beneficial to its citizens, non-threatening to area and regional neighbors, and progressing economically. But, the end of hostilities does not mean peace; it only provides the opportunity for peace to begin. For peace to take hold several conditions must be met. Among these conditions are elections, and the establishment of a popularly supported constitution. The constitution must pave the way

for individual freedoms, property rights, redress against the government, and equitable justice in the courts. Some may say these are western ideas of democracy to achieve peace. These individuals would not be wrong. Historical examples demonstrate the idea of a free people, choosing their destiny, sets the stage for long-term peace. If we can agree that long-term peace is beneficial, and governmental capitulation is a means to achieve it, then we must address what it takes to pursue capitulation.

Prior to pursuing capitulation as an end-state, there has to be significant, and demonstrable, reasons for setting out on that course. Pursuing governmental capitulation will require, planning, building national will, and resolve for remaining in the occupied country, until it is rebuilt in the manner described above. A rebuilding of the country after governmental capitulation is an effective means to achieve lasting peace and stability. The U.S. should adopt a framework that allows for the initial planning of governmental capitulation as an end-state when deciding on the use of military force. If it is important enough to commit military forces to battle, it should be important enough to dictate the terms of peace at the conclusion of hostilities.

Although there are examples where long term peace and stability were acquired through the use of military might, in U.S. history there is an insufficiency in the ways and means in planning for governmental capitulation. If the U.S. is faced with a belligerent nation state as its adversary, and all means of interaction have failed - these range from diplomacy, economic junctures, military overtures, up to and including limited warfare, and United Nations endeavors--the U.S. should plan to pursue governmental capitulation as an end-state to the use of military force. Admittedly, the use of military force has it own concerns. There are costs (money, lives lost through guerrilla war, time, political

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capital, deployments, etc.,) associated with governmental capitulation that cannot be overlooked. But also there are long-term national security implications if the U.S. does not pursue capitulation when conditions clearly threaten our country. Conditions such as the use of WMD, or state-sponsored terrorism, are two such examples. In these cases, governmental capitulation should be pursued from the outset, regardless of the costs.

Unfortunately some research could not be conducted. Some information regarding who, how and when the decisions to commit forces and what end-states would be sought in the historical examples used as case examples, was not available due to the classified nature, or because of lack of access to governmental records. However, each of the case examples was sufficiently discussed in public literature. Also some of the intended survey recipients are government officials and senior people in their field of work, and did not meet the timeline for return of the survey, or chose not to participate for various reasons.

Research is not complete. There is a need to further define long term peace and stability, winning the peace, how or if victory (and decisive victory) sets the stage for long term peace and stability, and finally what effects democracy (and the democratic ideas of liberty, human rights, i.e. the democratic model) has on building long-term peace and stability.

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[1]Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History?*, appeared in the National Interest in the summer of 1989.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ulysses S. Grant is widely believed as the first to be connected with this term. Edwin C. Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender: The Fall of Fort Donaldson*, Tennessee Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXI, March 1962.

[4]U.S. Army Information School, *Pamphlet No. 4, Pillars of Peace*, Carlisle Barracks, May 1946.

[5]Michael D. Pearlman, *Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb*, CSI, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. IX, *Cairo Conference*, November 1943, p 393.

[9]Dennis M. Zink, MMAS Survey Research, *Compelling Governments to Capitulate*, unpublished, December 2002.

[10]Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, US Army CGSC C500 course supplemental reading, AY 2002-2003.

APPENDIX A

"FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENTAL CAPITULATION"

Having a framework helps to define the end-state of a situation or crisis where use

of force (especially military) is being contemplated. A framework provides a matrix

detailing specific conditions, situations, internal and external factors, and can help

guide estimates on the effect to U.S. national security. It analyzes the instruments of

national power and highlights areas where efforts can be synchronized for maximum

effect. It provides for a study of likely impacts from the use of force. Finally, it

demonstrates when and where information operations can be incorporated for

maximum effect. As a general rule there are four levels: survival, vital, important, and

negligible.

Table 1. Determinants for Capitulation

Factor	Level
Determine the level of threat to a U.S. National Security Interest.	
Determine use and timeline for information operations campaign plan	
Determine the availability of instruments of national power to neutralize the threat.	
Determine the likelihood of convincing the belligerent to cease hostilities.	
Determine the likelihood of coercing the belligerent to cease hostilities.	
Determine the likelihood of containment/sanctions.	
Determine the likelihood that international/UN pressure on belligerent to effect change.	
Determine which instruments of national power can be used simultaneously.	
Determine if instruments of national power will enhance diplomatic overtures.	
Determine if appeasement is viable.[1]	
Determine if possible to build coalition and strengthen alliances.	
Determine possible impact of waiting to act.	
Determine legality and sovereignty issues with using force.	
Determine the motivation of the actors (national, ideological).	
Determine if preemption is warranted (clear and present or imminent	

danger).	
Determine the effect on International	
Determine the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS test) of the mechanics.	
Determine the international reaction to U.S. actions.	
Determine if U.S. intentions and justifications are understood.	
Determine if pursuing G.C. could cause escalation into total war. Determine the expenditure of national treasures (people, time, money, resources)	
Determine if action will increase Anti-Americanism.	
Determine if the U.S. will lose credibility among allies.	
Determine if action could lead to internal (U.S.) political infighting.	
Determine mechanism to prevent and mitigate negative news "blurbs."	
Determine and minimize second and third order effects of actions.	
Determine how to hold state actors accountable (by having tribunals and criminal trials).	
Determine the pros and cons of G.C. in terms of cost and effectiveness.	

Once these determinations are made, planning for pursuing governmental capitulation can begin. To best detail the desired end-state to operations, and a formula to rebuild, the following matrixes can be used.

Table 2. Viability of Capitulation

Determine Viable Usage of Pursuing Governmental Capitulation					
Impact	Conditions	Situations	Elements of concern	Internal factors	External factors
Strategic					
Political					
Media					
IO Plan					
Operational					

Capitulation as an end-state is meaningless without planning for the rebuild of the target country. The elements needed for country to rebuild and to prosper are:

a. Security forces (external peacekeeping forces until the central government can perform that function) to keep rival factions, or tribes, under control;

b. Expanding agriculture, employment, and foreign aid until economically rebuilt.

c. Instituting democratic ideals in the form of rights, suffrage, property rights, justice, constitutional practices and economic liberty.

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[1]See Stephen Rock's 16 tests for policy makers, *Appeasement in International Politics*, University Press of Kentucky, 2000.

APPENDIX B

SURVEY RESEARCH RESULTS

There are several parts of this appendix. Tab 1 includes the graphs and charts

derived from the percentages and statistical variations. It also includes the methodology

used to determine percentages and evaluate the data points of evidence. Tab 2 to this

appendix is the mail out survey used. Tab 3 is two pages of "quotable quotes," or

anecdotal information, from the open-ended question portion of the survey.

Dr. Bitters, of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Directorate of

Development and Assessments, approved the final survey instrument for public

distribution. The timeline for survey research used was:

December 17--Final survey approved
January 5--Mail-out begins (return suspense 25 Jan)
January 20--Receipt of surveys begins
February--Personal Interviews conducted
February--Review and analysis of survey data points
March--Determine findings and draft conclusions of survey results
March 25--Produce final conclusions of survey results

Any conclusions drawn from this survey research should not be used out of

context and without the demographic information. The narrow scope of respondents

precludes any assertions or conclusions of a specific nature to promote any particular

policy. The statistical significance for responses was verified by SSPS version 8.0 using

independent samples for N-PAR tests and Kruskal-Wallis tests. These samples are

maintained on electronic files.

TAB 1 TO APPENDIX B

GRAPHS AND CHARTS

1. Base count and percent of total respondents.

Question	Statistic	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation for U.S. National Security reasons.	Count	14	53	10	16	12
	Percent	13	50	10	15	11
2. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation for economic security.	Count	4	33	13	35	20
	Percent	4	31	12	33	19
3. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation for diplomatic security.	Count	3	30	25	32	15
	Percent	3	29	24	30	14
4. If attacked with Nuclear weapons, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.	Count	53	28	7	9	8
	Percent	50	27	7	9	8
5. If attacked with Chemical weapons, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.	Count	50	29	8	9	9
	Percent	48	28	8	9	9
6. If attacked with Biological weapons, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.	Count	50	29	8	10	8
	Percent	48	28	8	10	8
7. If attacked by State Sponsored Terrorism, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.	Count	36	35	10	14	10
	Percent	34	33	10	13	10
8. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation only as part of a UN Mandate.	Count	14	22	15	38	16
	Percent	13	21	14	36	15
9. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation only as part of a NATO Mandate.	Count	3	19	15	50	16
	Percent	3	18	15	49	16
10. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation with Western Allies only if necessary.	Count	3	27	22	45	9
	Percent	3	25	21	42	8
11. The U.S. should pursue a course of governmental capitulation unilaterally if necessary.	Count	12	44	17	18	14
	Percent	11	42	16	17	13

Question	Statistic	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
12. International reaction should not prevent the U.S. from pursuing a course of governmental capitulation.	Count	10	44	19	22	11
	Percent	9	42	18	21	10
13. In the past, the U.S. did not clearly define end-states when it has committed military forces.	Count	10	57	15	18	6
	Percent	9	54	14	17	6
14. In cases where the U.S. defined its objectives, and those objectives were met, they did nothing to improve our national security posture.	Count	2	17	24	57	4
	Percent	2	16	23	55	4
15. In cases where the U.S. defined its objectives, but those objectives were NOT met, it did not reduce our national security posture.	Count	3	19	38	39	3
	Percent	3	19	37	38	3
16. In cases where the U.S. defined its objectives, but those objectives were not met, it reduced our national security posture.	Count	4	44	28	27	2
	Percent	4	42	27	26	2
17. The U.S. effectively applies instruments of National Power to achieve desired end-states.	Count	4	56	19	25	2
	Percent	4	53	18	24	2
18. The U.S. Government should be concerned with the long-term commitments that may arise when defining end-states.	Count	35	60	2	7	2
	Percent	33	57	2	7	2
19. The U.S. Government should be concerned with negative elements that may arise if an end-state short of governmental capitulation is used.	Count	19	63	11	12	1
	Percent	18	59	10	11	1
20. The U.S. Government should be concerned with negative elements that may arise if governmental capitulation is pursued.	Count	25	64	5	10	2
	Percent	24	60	5	9	2
21. Use of military force to achieve end-states should be secondary to diplomatic efforts.	Count	37	46	9	11	2
	Percent	35	44	9	10	2

Question	Statistic	**Strongly Agree**	**Agree**	**Undecided**	**Disagree**	**Strongly Disagree**
22. The U.S. should attain diplomatic agreement when defining end-states involving military force.	Count	22	43	21	18	1
	Percent	21	41	20	17	1
23. The U.S. Government should be concerned if international diplomacy is damaged by using military force to achieve an end-state.	Count	19	62	11	12	2
	Percent	18	58	10	11	2

2. Tables of selected percents of respondents.

| 5. If attacked with Chemical weapons, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.	International Officer	30	60.73
	U.S. CGSOC Student	39	44.85
	Public Policy Organization	6	73.50
	Academic Provider	4	25.50
	College Student	3	70.00
	Civilian	3	95.00
	Gov't. Employee	10	39.20
	Other	3	50.67
	Military	7	58.86
	Total	105	

6. If attacked with Biological weapons, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.	International Officer	30	60.82
	U.S. CGSOC Student	39	44.68
	Public Policy Organization	6	73.67
	Academic Provider	4	25.50
	College Student	3	70.17
	Civilian	3	95.50
	Gov't. Employee	10	39.20
	Other	3	50.83
	Military	7	58.93
	Total	105	

19. The U.S. Government should be concerned with negative elements that may arise if an end-state short of governmental capitulation is used.	International Officer	31	46.18
	U.S. CGSOC Student	39	54.22
	Public Policy Organization	6	73.33
	Academic Provider	4	40.75
	College Student	3	83.33
	Civilian	3	85.50
	Gov't. Employee	10	50.60
	Other	3	67.17
	Military	7	44.00
	Total	106	

23. The U.S. Government should be concerned if international diplomacy is damaged by using military force to achieve an end-state.	International Officer	31	39.29
	U.S. CGSOC Student	39	54.18
	Public Policy Organization	6	70.67
	Academic Provider	4	62.50
	College Student	3	78.67
	Civilian	3	78.67
	Gov't. Employee	10	64.90
	Other	3	49.17
	Military	7	56.79
	Total	106	

8. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation only as part of a UN Mandate.	International Officer	30	32.17
	U.S. CGSOC Student	39	67.77
	Public Policy Organization	6	61.67
	Academic Provider	4	64.00
	College Student	3	55.67
	Civilian	3	19.67
	Gov't. Employee	10	62.45
	Other	3	34.50
	Military	7	53.86
	Total	105	
	Total	105	

3. Charts of selected percents of respondents.

13. In the past, the U.S. did not clearly define end-states when it has committed military forces.

7. If attacked by State Sponsored Terrorism, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.

TAB 2 TO APPENDIX B

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Compelling Governments to Capitulate
Survey

I would like to invite you to take a few moments to complete the following survey. You were selected as a survey participant because of your unique knowledge or experience in the formulation of Policy, National Security Policy or Governmental Policy Procedures, including International Relations. It is my hope that the results of this study determine whether it is feasible to develop a framework for consideration by policy-makers when deciding if to use military force and in developing end-states should military force be used.

This survey should only take 15-20 minutes to complete.

This Survey is Anonymous. There are no right or wrong answers. Please read each question carefully. Your opinion is very important and your input is extremely useful to the community of National Strategists and International Relations experts.

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION - PLEASE COMPLETE.

Current Profession	
Title of Current Position	
Highest Governmental Position (if any, including Military Service)	
Highest Business Position (if any)	
Previous Profession (if any)	

EDUCATION

Highest level of civilian education completed
- ☐ Associate degree
- ☐ Bachelors degree
- ☐ Some graduate courses
- ☐ Masters degree
- ☐ Juris Doctor
- ☐ Ph.D. or other doctoral level degree
- ☐ Multiple advanced degrees
- ☐ Multiple doctoral level degrees

STATUS

Current demographic status
- ☐ International Officer
- ☐ US CGSOC Student
- ☐ Public Policy Organization
- ☐ Academic Provider
- ☐ College Student
- ☐ Other (Please list)

_____

EXPERIENCE

Number Years Government Service (including Military Service, if any)	
Number Years Business Experience (if any)	
Number Years Academia Experience (serving as Professor/Instructor; Military or Civilian)	
Number Years Political Experience (if any)	
Number Years International/Overseas Experience (including Military Assignments if any)	
Number Years Involved in National Security (if any)	
Number Years Involved in National Policy (if any)	
Number Years Academic Experience Related to National Policy or National Security (if any)	

Go on to next page

Governmental capitulation is described as the situation in a country at the national level, where the ruling authorities have relinquished power and do not control the country, the military is destroyed or rendered incapable of conducting medium or large scale operations, and the populace is subjected to martial law by an occupying force.
With this in mind, please answer the following questions.

- Use a pen to fill in responses. Use red, black, or blue ink.
- Make solid marks that fill the box completely.
- Make no stray marks on this form.

CORRECT: ■   INCORRECT: ☑ ☒ ▭ ◪

Section 2: National Security...

How much do you agree/disagree with the following statements?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation for <u>U.S. National Security reasons</u>.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation for <u>economic security</u>.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation for <u>diplomatic security</u>.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. If attacked with <u>Nuclear</u> weapons, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. If attacked with <u>Chemical</u> weapons, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. If attacked with <u>Biological</u> weapons, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. If attacked by <u>State Sponsored Terrorism</u>, the U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation only as part of a **UN Mandate**.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation only as part of a **NATO Mandate**.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. The U.S. should pursue governmental capitulation with **Western Allies only** if necessary.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11. The U.S. should pursue a course of governmental capitulation **unilaterally** if necessary.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12. **International reaction** should not prevent the U.S. from pursuing a course of governmental capitulation.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Go on to next page

- Use a pen to fill in responses. Use red, black, or blue ink.
- Make solid marks that fill the box completely.
- Make no stray marks on this form.

CORRECT: ■   INCORRECT: ☑ ☒ ⊟ ☐

How much do you agree/disagree with the following statements?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
13. In the past, the U.S. did not clearly define end-states when it has committed military forces.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
14. In cases where the U.S. defined its objectives, and those objectives were met, they did nothing to improve our national security posture.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
15. In cases where the U.S. defined its objectives, but those objectives were NOT met, it did not reduce our national security posture.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
16. In cases where the U.S. defined its objectives, but those objectives were not met, it reduced our national security posture.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
17. The U.S. effectively applies instruments of National Power to achieve desired end-states.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
18. The U.S. Government should be concerned with the long-term commitments that may arise when defining end-states.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
19. The U.S. Government should be concerned with negative elements that may arise if an end-state short of governmental capitulation is used.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
20. The U.S. Government should be concerned with negative elements that may arise if governmental capitulation is pursued.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
21. Use of military force to achieve end-states should be secondary to diplomatic efforts.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
22. The U.S. should attain diplomatic agreement when defining end-states involving military force.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
23. The U.S. Government should be concerned if international diplomacy is damaged by using military force to achieve an end-state.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Section 4: Short Answer

24. What are the reasons America should pursue a course of compelling a government to capitulate?

_____

_____

Go on to next page

25. What elements prevent the U.S. from pursuing a course of compelling a government to capitulate?

_____

_____

26. How does a nation build National Will to pursue a course of compelling a government to capitulate?

_____

_____

27. What are the political considerations of pursuing a course of compelling a government to capitulate?

_____

_____

28. What are the benefits of pursuing a course of compelling a government to capitulate?

_____

_____

29. What are the perils of pursuing a course of compelling a government to capitulate?

_____

_____

Section 5: Comments

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY!

Please Return Survey

TAB 3 TO APPENDIX B

ANECDOTAL INFORMATION AND QUOTABLE QUOTES

For Capitulation:

- The U.S. should pursue G.C. preemptively if needed.
- A policy of G.C. will show strength and resolve for Justice (in the world).
- A threat to allied nations survival = a threat to U.S. national security interests.
- **G.C. provides a deterrent effect for future crises.**
- Definitely for use of WMD against the U.S.
- G.C. holds state actors accountable.
- If used for collective defense.
- "Will turn America the ubiquitous into America the indispensable."
- **A coalition working towards capitulation is the shortest way to get rid of an evil government.**

Building Will:

- **Congress is read in and supports the action.**
- Must demonstrate as a viable and last resort alternative if you want to build will.
- Only after all other facets of DIME have expired (been exhausted).
- An IO had difficulty answering because he supported G.C. if done as part of UN and international effort, but not as a unilateral U.S. action.
- 3 tests: grave danger, will of people, and international recognition of danger.

Against Capitulation:

- **Peace becomes defined by the conquering nation, not the conquered**(the Domestic Goddess said this)
- International Laws prevent capitulation of other nations
- Does the U.S. belief of "right to self-determination" negate a policy of G.C.?
- No reason to do it.
- **A lack of a clear, well-articulated policy prevents pursuing G.C.**
- Sets a dangerous precedence for other nation states to populist support.
- Could cause a disruption of power balance in a region.
- **May not solve the root problem for aggressive nature of a country.**
- Will break the international balance of power.

Perils:

- A lack of foresight in pursuing G.C. could cause escalation into total war.
- Total chaos (as a result of G.C.)
- **Capitulation without an end-state is meaningless.**
- Expenditure of national treasures (people, time, money, and natural resources)

- **Could be a backlash against the U.S.**
- U.S. is seen as seeking selfish interests.
- Increase Anti-Americanism.
- Could turn Alliances against the U.S.
- **Loss of credibility among allies and a misunderstanding of intentions.**
- Leaving a void potentially destabilizes a region.
- Could lead to internal (U.S.) political infighting. Domestic versus foreign agendas.
- Anarchy.
- The falling apart of U.S. institutions (legislative, Executive, and Judicial).
- Negative news "blurbs."
- Second and third order effects of actions.

Possibilities:

- I hope your work (in formulating a policy for G.C.) is fruitful for you, our nation, and the world.
- **To prevent a war being considered by a (hostile) regime.**

Miscellaneous:

- **Need a framework or model that supports and reinforces our alliances prior to pursuing G.C.**
- **The plan must be sound, moral and justified and must have an end-state.**
- Must link the target government as a threat to "everymans" way of life.
- Hold state actors accountable by having tribunals (and criminal trials).
- End-states have not been quantifiable or they have "creeped" into something else.
- **As the world's only superpower, such power requires very careful consideration of the issues at hand.**

APPENDIX C

CASE STUDY EVALUATION CRITERIA

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

- Name of country.

- Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation).

- Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII).

- Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military).

- Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use of military force to resolve the crisis.

- What vital national interests of nations involved were threatened by this action?

- Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts).

- Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful.

- What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis.

- Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if present.

- Describe the outcome of the use of force.

- Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally.

- Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force.

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- Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken.

- Strategic end-states and strategic objectives of opposing forces.

- Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and 50 years after the use of force.

- Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years.

Tab 1 to Appendix C

Country Case Studies

1. The following country case studies are attached in chronological order:

Germany WWI

Germany WWII

Japan WWII

Korea

Vietnam

Grenada

Panama

Iraq (Desert Storm)

Kosovo

Somalia

Afghanistan

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: GERMANY (WWI)

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation): cease-fire after years of fighting, trench warfare, no decisive victory or regime change.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII): Assassination of Archbishop Ferdinand, feudal and monarchal system still in play; empire building, distrust after years of fighting, competition for resources.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): Kaiser Wilhelm and technocrats, King Edward of GB, King of France. Unknown diplomats, Unknown Military.

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use of military force to resolve the crisis: Rumors of war caused mobilization. Mobilization caused increased tensions and responsive mobilizations, eventually leading to pre-emptive attacks.

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations involved: maintain status quo, expand empire (resource base) but not necessarily at expense of others, once war started: Germany to conquer France; France to survive; GB to stop aggression.

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): State level diplomatic envoys used, economic concessions to Germany from GB, communication about intent of mobilizations (to no avail).

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: Appeasement tried by giving Kaiser state level recognition, diplomacy to resolve assassination.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis: Economically the competition for resources, religious overtones of the assassination.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if present: Aim was to defeat military forces on the ground. Rules of war did not allow attack on monarchal system (regime change), no planning for it.

Describe the outcome of the use of force: Stalemate.

Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: N/A.

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force: No.

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: WWII was result of Versailles Treaty.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: Economic sanctions (reparations) levied against Germany were severe. Costs of war led to appeasement policy. Beginnings of democracy in Germany until Hitler.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: Hostile until WWII.

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: GERMANY (WWII)

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation):
Unconditional surrender after years of fighting, total victory over military and government, regime change effected by Marshall Plan, no confiscatory reparations taxes.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII):
Appeasement policy tried because of horrendous losses in WWI, feudal and monarchical system dying, empire maintenance phase, competition for resources continues, U.S. Russia, Germany, GB superpowers till after war, then U.S. and Russia are left.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): Hitler and Chamberlain, then Hitler and Churchill, DeGaulle, Roosevelt, and Stalin. Unknown diplomats. Military was Rommel, Georing, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Patton.

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use of military force to resolve the crisis: Hitler was on rise to power, annexed Austria, Sudatenland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and then invaded Poland causing war declarations on many sides.

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations involved: Hitler was rise to pre-eminent power in world, GB, France and U.S. was maintain status quo. Once war started, Germany to win, GB and France to stop aggression, Russia to lie low until strong enough to attack Germany, U.S. was isolationist. Later it became survival for Germany, France to get back independence, GB to win peace, U.S. to pursue unconditional surrender to win long-term peace and stability.

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): State level diplomatic envoys and conferences (summits) to try to appease Hitler. Non-aggression pact between Russia and Germany.

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: Appeasement tried by giving Hitler land (living space) based on flimsy arguments. Each attempt emboldened Hitler and ultimately were not successful. Russia's non-aggression pact did achieve the time Russia needed to mobilize.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis:
Political as described, economically Germany was being strangled by the reparations burden, competition for resources continued, religious none, technological changes were armor and air power, social none.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if present: COA of unconditional surrender was only an afterthought after war was

declared. It was decided upon to enforce, through occupation, rebuilding the country in democratic model.

Describe the outcome of the use of force: Complete and total military victory leading to unconditional surrender of Germany.

Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: No.

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force: Not really, League of Nations had no influence due to U.S. not joining.

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: Yes. Germany has become democratic, prosperous, secure and stable.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: Economic prosperity increased and Germany enjoys high standard of living. Germany instituted parliamentary system of government involving its citizens in the democratic process.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: Germany and France have both joined the EU, U.S. enjoys basing rights in Germany. Most are NATO members.

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: JAPAN (WWI)

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation): Unconditional surrender of Japan after two atomic bombs were dropped. Regime change and end of Emperor as god-like figure and head of state. Parliamentary system with Prime Minister.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII): Axis Powers (Germany, Japan, Italy) on domination and empire building sprees. Competition for resources continued.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): Emperor Tojo, Roosevelt, and Stalin. Unknown diplomats. Military was Yamamoto, Nimmitz, and MacArthur in the pacific. Russia was part of the Allied forces and had border issues with Japan, but did not intervene militarily in the Pacific theater.

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use of military force to resolve the crisis: Japanese aggression in Manchuria unchecked by League of Nations. Escalation of tensions between Japan and U.S. as Japan continues to conquer territory. Embargo eventually lead to preemptive attack at Pearl Harbor.

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations involved: Japan was building empire to attain resources - fighting to protect resources from embargo. U.S. was trying to deter aggression in Pacific. Russia and Europe was busy with Hitler. Later unconditional surrender was decided upon as end-state.

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): State level diplomatic envoys used, negotiations in Washington with Japanese Ambassador.

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: None apparent.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis: Economically the competition for resources. Religious overtones of Kamikaze and god-like fanaticism of people for the Emperor. Socially people of Japan were co-opted to follow military and Emperor for national survival (embargo). Technology was atom bomb to negate need for invasion of mainland Japan.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if present: Aim was to take back territories acquired by Japan and deter aggression. Later unconditional surrender became COA, no planning for it.

Describe the outcome of the use of force: Complete victory and regime change.

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Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: No. Allied powers assisted (mainly Aussies in Pacific theater).

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force: Yes, but League of Nations was waning in power since U.S. did not join.

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: Long term peace and stability were a result of decisive and complete victory.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: Japan is one of the most industrious nations with 3rd largest economy. Japanese people have more freedoms and individual rights under democratic government.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: U.S. is Japan's leading trading partner of manufactured goods. Japan and U.S. relations are strong.

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation): Cease-fire after 3 years of fighting. Demilitarized zone (DMZ) divides the peninsula at the 38th parallel. Technically two Koreas are still at war. Massive build-ups of armies. Presence of UN and U.S. forces since cease-fire. Absence of peace, stability, prosperity.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII): Post WWII. Cold war fairly new. Communism new stated enemy of free people (mainly U.S.). NATO formed but focused on Europe. UN fledgling institution.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): DPRK was Kim Il Sung, China was Chaing Kai Shek, U.S. was Eisenhower and GEN McArthur.

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use of military force to resolve the crisis: Newly independent territories of north and south Korea (from Japanese occupation) could not agree on type of government. Temporarily decided upon two Koreas. DPRK invaded Republic of Korea - South Korea (ROK) and drove military forces to southernmost point of peninsula. UN forces (U.S. led) invaded peninsula and fought northward. Forces went to far north (across Yalu river) causing China to become involved. Cease-fire ended conflict without any resolution to root problem (uniting the peninsula under one Korean system).

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations involved: DPRK was creation of unified peninsula under one system. Objective of DPRK was capitulation of ROK. ROK was survival as a democratic country. UN was peace and stability. U.S. was stemming tide of communism. China was national security. End-state was peaceful resolution of unifying the peninsula.

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): UN debated the issue. The two Koreas conducted dialogue with sponsoring nations.

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: No.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis: Communism (threat of spread) played a role. It was first real challenge to UN as international organization to promote nations rights and maintain peace and stability. U.S. standing as newest world power was tested if ideal of spreading democracy was valid.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if present: The center of gravity for the DPRK shifted to the military rulers as the form of government. When the military wasn't fully defeated (escaped across the Yalu river) the government remained intact, albeit dislocated. After Chinese intervention it was no

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longer possible to force capitulation of DPRK leaders. Any planning for capitulation became obsolete.

Describe the outcome of the use of force: Stalemate. ROK was able to keep southern half of peninsula.

Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: No. UN backed coalition fought on ROK side.

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force: Yes. UN.

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: No. Hostilities and threats of invasion for over fifty years.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: ROK has prospered under democratic model despite massive defense spending and open hostilities with DPRK. DPRK suffers immensely (famine, disease) because it chose to isolate itself from community of nations.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: Still at war.

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: VIETNAM

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation): South Vietnam falls to North Vietnam conquest.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII): Post WWII, cold war about 15 years old. Spread of communism progressing (Korea, Cuba, North Vietnam). UN active resolving international disputes.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): North Vietnam was Ho Chi Mihn, and GEN Giap. South Vietnam was Diem. U.S. was Kennedy (later Johnson and Nixon), MacNamara, and Taylor. Unknown diplomats.

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use of military force to resolve the crisis: French were working towards independent South Vietnam after liberation form Japanese occupation. North Vietnam was supporting insurrection forces called Viet Mihn. These forces were having success over French and SVN forces. French began pullout in late 1950. UN declines involvement. U.S. begins sending military advisors. Eventually U.S. forces allowed to conduct "offensive" operations in defense of SVN.

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations involved: South Vietnam was survival. North Vietnam was unification of peninsula. U.S. was stem tide of communism. French was rubber and other resources. China and USSR was promoting communism (by supplying NVN).

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): N/A. Fighting in SVN since early 1950s.

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: N/A.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis: Politically the U.S. felt it had to wage a limited war, so as to not provoke WWIII. This strategy of "defense only" failed. No economic problems since both sides had outside supporters. Social acceptance of war in U.S. forced withdrawal by end of 1973. Technology saw use of strategic bombing (mildly successful), herbicides to detect enemy supply lines and helicopters for re-supply, casualty evacuation and command and control.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if present: As stated above, the U.S. could not send sufficient forces to invade NVN, and was not allowed to operate in Laos and Cambodia. No planning for compelling NVN government to capitulate.

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Describe the outcome of the use of force: Stalemate, and withdrawal of U.S. forces allowed NVN to overthrow SVN government.

Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: Yes (excluding SVN).

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force: Yes, but ineffective (UN).

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: Actually, southeast Asia as a whole is stable, however, SVN no longer exists. Relations with NVN are improving.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: Economic prosperity improved throughout SE Asia. Vietnam improved slightly.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: SVN no longer exists. U.S. Vietnam relations are improving.

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: GRENADA

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation):
Cuba sent military "advisors" to begin insurrection on Island. Overthrow of
democratically elected government by assassination. Followed by invasion of U.S. and
OECS (Organization of East Caribbean States) to restore legitimate government.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII):
Bi-polar world, Soviet and NATO influence. Brush wars in outlying (third-world)
countries because of desire to increase ideological influences. Post Vietnam for U.S.
with Soviets in Afghanistan.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): Cuba - Fidel
Castro (revolutionary), U.S. - Pres. Reagan, Cryus Vance, and MG Schwartzkopf, USSR
- Premier Chernenko, Grenada - PM Bishop (assassinated) Dep PM Coard and GEN
Austin take control, UK Counsel General Sir Paul Scoon (requested assistance).

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use
of military force to resolve the crisis: Insurrection began with protests and attempts to
seize control of parliament, ending with PM assassination. New leaders arrested UK
authority, took U.S. citizens hostage. No reported negotiations or diplomacy.

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations
involved: Grenada was survival and wanted to restore legitimate government.
Organization of East Caribbean States was peace and stability in the region as well as
deterring Cuba from doing it to another island. UK was historical relationship with one
of its colonies (Queen is head of state for Grenada). U.S. was regional stability,
protecting U.S. citizens, and restoring legitimate government. Cuba unknown.

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): None
found.

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: None found.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis:
Politically, did the U.S. have the right to intervene and was Cuba trying to become a
regional hegemony. Economically none. Religious none. Technology on the U.S. side
was the new joint doctrine. How to make this a joint operation so as to test the new
doctrine.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if
present: Unlikely that any negotiation would return island to legitimate government.
There was planning for regime change (of the coup leaders).

Describe the outcome of the use of force: Military victory with subsequent occupation, rebuilding and restoration of government with democratic elections.

Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: No. OECS, U.S. (with UK approval), and Jamaica.

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force: No, however afterwards, the UN general assembly condemned the action.

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: Yes. Grenada has been secure and stable since Oct 1983.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: Economically Grenada has prospered. Democracy still prevails.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: Grenada enjoys good relations with the U.S. and the OECS.

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: PANAMA

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation):
GEN Noriega seizes control of government by bloodless coup and begins support for
drug smuggling. Later agrees to elections but after losing he declares elections void.
Refuses to stop supporting drug smuggling even after convicted in U.S. court. Puts U.S.
military, family members and U.S. civilians in danger. U.S. invades, topples
government, arrest Noriega, establish legitimately elected presidency.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII):
Still bi-polar world although USSR struggling with glasnost. Cold war still in progress.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): Panama was
GEN Noriega, U.S. was President Bush, Cheney, Powell, Crowe, Baker, Woerner, and
Thurman.

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use
of military force to resolve the crisis: Allegations of Panama being used to support
money laundering and drug smuggling. Later became criminal charges against Noriega
in U.S. court - Noriega refuses to extradite himself. The killing of U.S. service members
and the torturing of others led to invasion of U.S. forces.

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations
involved: Panama was regime survival and non-extradition to the U.S. For the U.S. it
was protection of U.S. citizens, the security of the Panama canal, and ending a corrupt
regime.

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): State
Department was attempting various overtures, all to no avail. Information campaign was
being used to build anti-Noriega sentiment in Latin America. Economic - none.

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: Appeasement,
negotiations and compromises on points of mutual interest were ongoing. Ultimately
security concerns outweighed other efforts.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis:
Politically, Noriega was making Bush look bad in the media. Social concerns were the
support for drug smuggling. Technology saw the first use of cellular intercepts to track
Noriega's movements.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if
present: Other efforts to effect regime change in Panama failed. Regime change was
planned for (but was hoped an internal coup would occur). Planning for it included
allowing the elected government to take control of the country.

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Describe the outcome of the use of force: Noriega captured and PDF beaten. Panama given to elected president. Peace and stability since invasion.

Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: Yes.

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force: Yes. On the U.S. side, the U.S. Federal Courts. On Noriega's side, the drug cartel was supplying him with money to equip his private army (PDF).

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: Yes.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: Economic prosperity. Panama canal given to Panama as promised. Operation of the canal privatized and profitable for Panama. Free and fair election cycle continues unabated.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: Panama enjoys good relations with the U.S. and its neighbors. Panama is no longer a haven for drug smuggling.

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: IRAQ (DESERT STORM)

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation): Iraqi Army, under Sadam Hussein, invades and occupies Kuwait. U.S. and coalition forces (UK, KSA, FR) attack Iraqi Army and expel them from Kuwait. COA does not include going to Baghdad and toppling Hussein (UN resolution only allows freeing Kuwait). Northern and southern no fly zones established to protect minority populations and neighboring countries.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII): Post cold war. U.S. enjoys sole super power status. UK very close ally of U.S.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): Iraq was Hussein and Aziz. U.S. was Bush, Powell, Cheney, and Schwartzkopf. UK was Margaret Thatcher. UN was Boutrous Boutrous Gali. KSA was King Fahd.

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use of military force to resolve the crisis: Iraq was complaining Kuwait was draining common oil pools and cross drilling into Iraqi pools. U.S. did not forcefully stop Iraq during consultations. Iraq given ultimatum by UN to leave Kuwait. Iraq refuses. U.S. builds up forces and gives 2nd ultimatum. Iraq again refuses.

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations involved: Iraq was keeping new land and keeping regime. UN was restoring status quo. U.S. was to establish long term presence to ensure security. UK same as U.S.

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): Many as stated above. UN efforts, diplomacy, sanctions, and demarches.

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: Compromise by way of allowing Hussein to stay in power and stopping Kuwait from drilling sideways.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis: Political factor was Israel entering the conflict and busting the coalition (which included Arab countries). Hussein tried to use Islam to gain religious support. Technological was smart weapons, patriot missile defense, and bunker busting bombs.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if present: UN would only agree to evicting Iraq from Kuwait, not to toppling Hussein.

Describe the outcome of the use of force: Iraqi Army defeated, Kuwait liberated and cease-fire led to 12-year stalemate with frequent violations by Hussein. Eventual sanctions and oil for food program (which was corrupt).

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Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: No. See above.

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force: Yes. See above.

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: No. Eventually led to operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: Economic downturn because of sanctions and regime corrupting sales under oil for food. Dictator still in power violating human rights and supporting terrorism.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: Irreconcilable. Governmental capitulation finally pursued by U.S. and coalition of the willing. Hussein no longer in power.

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: SOMALIA

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation):
U.S. took casualties during humanitarian operations causing withdrawal of forces.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII):
Post cold war. U.S. is unequaled superpower and becoming involved in more
humanitarian projects (Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia). UN becoming more prominent as
arbiter of disputes and aid.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): U.S. was
Clinton, Albright, and Cohen. UN Secretary General was Kofi Anan. United Somali
Congress (USC) split and several factions vied for power. Strongest warlord was known
as Adiid.

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use
of military force to resolve the crisis: Military forces already present performing
humanitarian aid mission. Mission changed to stabilization of the country and
elimination of warlords. No end-state defined for new mission.

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations
involved: Somali warlords was maintenance of power. U.S. was performing aid mission.
UN was promoting stability and aid mission.

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): N/A.

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: No.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis:
Economically the country was in shambles. Warring factions used UN aid for power and
corruption. Political environment in U.S. changed to non-hawkish president.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if
present: No COA was used. Mission changed without proper planning and resourcing.

Describe the outcome of the use of force: U.S. took casualties and withdrew prior to
capturing Adiid or rebuilding the country to be self-sufficient.

Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: Yes, with one exception (UN forces did
serve as a back up).

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations)
involved prior to use of force: Yes, the UN.

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: No.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: Economically still in shambles. No ruling authority. No UN aid or support. Somalia considered haven for terrorists and warlords.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: Hostile.

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACADONIA (FYROM)

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation): Regime change after massive NATO bombing. Milosovich capitulates power.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII): Post cold war. Newly independent states (Bosnia, Yugoslavia) degrade into civil wars and genocide campaigns. UN unable to stop genocide. NATO (at urging of U.S.) intervenes.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): FYROM was Solobadon Milosovich. NATO was GEN Clark. U.S. was Clinton, Albright, Cohen. UK was Blair.

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use of military force to resolve the crisis: Diplomatic, UN, NATO attempts to get Milosovich to end genocide went unheeded.

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations involved: Milosovich was to stay in power and continue cleansing FYROM. UN was humanitarian and human rights. U.S. was humanitarian and democracy. NATO was peace and stability. End-state was Milosovich to leave power and stand trial for war crimes.

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): UN debated the issue. Economic sanctions were called for. U.S. encouraged NATO to demonstrate resolve and threaten force.

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: No.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis: Ethnicity played a role (genocide). Political factors included fledgling nation newly independent without system of check and balances on power of president. Economically may have been long term consequences, but none noticeable in the short term. Technological factors included new carbon (diode) bombs able to short circuit electrical power plants without destroying them.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if present: Power was placed in hands of single person contrary to designs of constitution after FYROM gained independence. Single person became dictator and had to be removed, but would not voluntarily step down. Regime change was planned for and design was to turn government back over to people as intended.

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Describe the outcome of the use of force: Successful capitulation of Milosovich with minimal loss to civilians and infrastructure (almost surgical).

Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: No. NATO owned campaign.

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force: Yes. UN and NATO.

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: Yes. Although peacekeeping operations still ongoing, FYROM is creating democratic government with checks and balances that provides all ethnic persuasions safety and freedom.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: Has only been 10 years, but conditions in the country are improving.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: N/A.

Case Study Criteria for Evaluation

Name of country: AFGHANISTAN

Describe the event (regime change, unconditional surrender, coup de'taut, capitulation): Governmental capitulation as a result of U.S. invasion with military forces.

Describe the global historical setting (bipolar world, alliances, post WWI, post WWII): Post cold war. Post 9/11 attacks in U.S. UN unable to stop terrorism. U.S. sole superpower.

Describe the actors involved (Leaders, Senior Diplomats, Senior Military): Afghanistan was the Taliban regime (Omar) and Al-Queada (Bin Laden). U.S. was Bush (George W.), Rumsfield, Cheney, Rice, and Powell. Pakistan was Musharaf. UN was Kofi Anon. UK was Blair.

Describe the time period between the first (recognizable) elements of a crisis and the use of military force to resolve the crisis: Al-Queada gaining boldness and wider network of cells to conduct terrorist operations. Series of five terrorist attacks linked to Al-Queada (1993 World Trade Center attack, 1996 Khobar Towers, 1998 U.S. Embassies in Africa, 2000 USS Cole, 2001 twin towers). Afghanistan supporting Al-Queada and hiding head of network (Bin Laden).

What vital national interests, strategic end-states, and strategic objectives of nations involved: U.S. was national security. Afghanistan was money from Al-Queada. Al-Queada was jihad against the U.S. End-state was end to Al-Queada network and Afghan supported terrorism.

Were any instruments of power used prior to use of force (diplomatic efforts): UN debated the issue. U.S. encouraged international community to deter terrorism.

Were any efforts of appeasement or compromise used or successful: No.

What political, economic, religious, social and technological factors influenced the crisis: Religion played a role (jihad). Politically there were no repercussions on U.S. since direct link was made to Afghanistan and its role in global terrorism.

Describe the reasons for pursuing the COA taken; describe planning for regime change, if present: Government capitulation was sought since Taliban regime could not effectively control (and was complicit in) terrorist networks operating freely in its country. Regime change was planned for and design was to turn government back over to people. Interim leader Kharizi continues to build democratic government.

Describe the outcome of the use of force: Successful capitulation of Taliban, serious disruption (if not defeat) of Al-Queada network, end to terror attacks since invasion.

Was the action (use of force) taken unilaterally: Yes.

Was there a UN, regional, or other political body (NATO, OECS, League of Nations) involved prior to use of force: No.

Were peace and stability a result of the actions taken: Yes. Although nation building still on going and pockets of resistance remain, stability appears to be achieved. Interim government is creating democratic government with checks and balances that provides all ethnic persuasions safety and freedom.

Describe the conditions (economic, democracy) in the country twenty years, and fifty years after the use of force: Has only been 1 year, but conditions in the country are improving.

Describe the relationship between the two countries involved after twenty or fifty years: N/A.

APPENDIX D

SELECTED DOCTRINES ON THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Casper Wienberger Doctrine: Vital to our national interest or the interests of our allies. Clear intention of winning. Have clearly defined political and military objectives. The relationship between our objectives and the force must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Reasonable assurance of having the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.[1]

Colin Powell Doctrine: "War should be the politics of last resort, and when we go to war, we should have a purpose that our people understand and support; we should mobilize our country's resources to fulfill that mission and then join to win."[2]

Richard Nixon Doctrine: The U.S. should be judicious in application of military power to meet its global role; there should be a greater degree of burden sharing by U.S. allies in the defense of their own land; American help in the creation of independent power centers to maintain local stability has the added effect as a means for securing U.S. interests abroad.[3]

Benyamin Netanyahu Doctrine: "There is only one option now available to Israel (for reaching any sustainable peace): to decisively win the war that has been forced upon it. What is required of us today is not a willingness to clench our teeth and bear this ongoing violence. We must instead seek a total military victory against an implacable enemy that is waging a terrorist war against us."[4]

Winston Churchill Doctrine: "to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word--it's victory. Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be. For without victory there is no survival."[5]

Ulysses S. Grant Doctrine: Unconditional Surrender. See chapter 5.

William T. Sherman Doctrine: Why has the South become so toadyish & sycophantic? I think it is because the best and noblest were killed off during the war. Hence what Sherman called the awful fact: Victory required "that the present class of men who rule the South must be killed outright."[6]

Rush Limbaugh Doctrine: Unleash a competent military to win peace (through victory).[7]

Limited War (limited power) Doctrine: Kosovo was a vindication of the doctrine of limited power for limited ends. Incremental escalation of precision guided munitions worked when used long enough (to achieve objectives, i.e. Milosovich stepping down. After it became apparent that a constrained, phased approach was not effective, NATO widened the air campaign to produce strategic effects in Serbia proper.

Anthony Lake Doctrine: Lake was impetus for 2000 national security strategy of engagement. Conciliation and interaction should drive diplomatic efforts above all else.

Bob Woodward (extrapolated) Use of Force Doctrine: Is there significant provocation? Would the military plan resolve the problem? Would the plan minimize damage and casualties? Will it bring "Democracy"? What will be the public (and press) reaction?[8]

Jeffery Record Doctrine: Intervention is OK if necessary, but only if necessary. The U.S. should only fight wars of necessity versus wars of choice.[9]

Decisive Victory Doctrine (U.S. Army White Paper): As an instrument of American policy, the (sic) U.S. Army must be ready to provide the nation a variety of tools to influence the international environment and ultimately force a decision (1994).

Stephen R. Rock Appeasement Doctrine: There are 11 points to consider for policymakers whom may decide upon a strategy of appeasement: know your adversary, reevaluate policy on a regular basis, devise tests, modify or abandon appeasement in ineffectual, maintain capacity for alternative policy, centralize policy implementation, be patient and flexible, be aware of incrementalism, avoid passive appeasement, socialization of actor states requires internalization of norms, do not rely on personal relationships.[10]

Nicholas Riegg Doctrine: There are 3 approaches to crisis: take steps that are directed inwardly (toward strengthening domestic institutions), take steps that are outwardly orientated and intended to affect the position of other states, use combination of the two.

Zink Doctrine: Train and equip our forces for war, but Pray for peace. Use force only as a last resort to secure and protect our most vital national security interests. Use Diplomacy, Economics, and Information Operations to attack and effect the root causes of a problem. If force becomes necessary pursue decisive victory, including governmental capitulation, to eliminate the current problem as well as the root causes of the conflict.

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[1]Speech to National Press Club following Beirut bombing of U.S. Marine Corps barracks, 1983.

[2]Colin Powel's *My American Journey*, 2001.

[3]Robert Hanks, *U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads: Two Views*, Foreign Policy Report, July 1982, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

[4]LA Times article, April 6, 2002.

[5]Public Address, May 13, 1940.

[6]Appeared in article by syndicated columnist George F. Will, *General Sherman's Advice*, Thursday December 27, 2001 (multiple sources).

[7]Rush Limbaugh web site archives, 2002.

[8]Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, 2002.

[9]Jeffery Record, *Making War, Thinking Peace*, 2002.

[10]Stephen Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, The University Press of Kentucky (2000).

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